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 This study explores the emerging economic position of a selection of educated 
Malay Muslim women in Brunei: the urban businesswomen. My thesis attempts to 
unsettle the mainstream perceptions of Brunei that assume all the members of this society 
depend unconditionally on the government for their economic and social well-being. 
While this may largely still be the case, such a presumption certainly does not encompass 
some major developments in the private sector since the late nineties. I focus on the 
unprecedented rise of independent and educated middle-aged businesswomen who 
formed the Women’s Business Council (WBC) to disclose how the economic relationship 
between some citizens of Brunei and the government is in fact more inter-dependent than 
earlier thought. My thesis reveals that the businesswomen of the WBC share an enviable 
economic position that does not depend on the government.  
Along the journey of five chapters, I slowly unravel the circumstances that 
allowed and created such a possibility of economic independence for these women. In the 
first Chapter Two show how the WBC is unlike any other national women’s 
organizations in Brunei. In Chapter Three, I link the changing social mores with evolving 
government policies in the seventies and eighties to show how a whole generation of 
educated working women became prominent in Brunei. By Chapter Four, I explore the 
ways in which these educated women negotiated familial obligations and their desire to 
progress in their career during the nineties. In this chapter, we also see how the 
government was instrumental in encouraging many of these ambitious career women to 
become businesswomen. Finally, in Chapter Five, we learn that these businesswomen 
have many obstacles with running a successful company in Brunei. This way I unwrap 
the ways in which the members of the WBC have been effective in solving their own 
problems without relying on the government. 
Since few critical studies and no ethnographies exist on the lives of women and 
men in Brunei, I have employed multiple methodologies to substantiate my main 
argument. I used a combination of personal interviews, journal articles, old books, 
national newspapers and web blogs to develop a wholesome and contextualized picture of 
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A Country Called Brunei 
 
Brunei is a small country tucked away in the Northern part of the island of Borneo 
with fewer than a third of a million citizens. Unlike many developing countries in 
Southeast Asia, the government of Brunei sustains its domestic growth and infrastructure 
overwhelmingly with the export of oil and natural gas that contributed to over 60 percent 
of its GDP from 1990 onwards.1 Since the beginning of the exploitation of oil in the 
fifties, the population of this oil rich state has enjoyed an average standard of living 
enviable by the rest of Southeast Asia. Since the discovery of oil, the socio-political 
system was fossilized by its immense wealth generated by that resource. 
From 1962, the year when the Sultan declared the state of emergency suspending 
democratic processes, the regime has conserved its power without any substantial 
challenge.2 In order to reach this position, the Sultanate created in the seventies a welfare-
based socio-economic system that bestowed a high income, free healthcare and 
education, subsidized housing and electricity to all its citizens in exchange for their 
loyalty to the Monarch. However, beneath the surface of this placidity lie deep problems 
with respect to the citizen’s sense of economic stagnancy that may gather the potential to 
shatter this otherwise sustainable balance.  
Brunei at the turn of the twentieth century was one of the least wealthy British 
protectorates with only 12,000 people and a very poor Sultan who ruled over 
impoverished kampongs.3 However, with divine grace or plain luck, the Sultanate of 
Brunei discovered oil in the late thirties and since then Brunei never faced budget deficits 
                                                 
1 Ali Ameer, “From Penury to Plenty: The Development of Oil Rich Brunei, 1906 to Present.” Department 
of Research Monograph Series 2. Perth: Murdoch University, 1996. 
2 Singh, Ranjit. Brunei 1839-1984: The Problems of Political Survival. New York: Oxford UP, 1984.   
3 McArthur, M.S.H. “Report on Brunei in 1904.” Monographs in International Studies: Southeast Asia 
Series, Ohio: Ohio UP: 1987. 
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again. By the late thirties, the country’s revenues ran well over and above any national 
expenditure unlike the period between 1906 and 1937.4 Now, Brunei is completely 
dependent on its precious but exhaustive oil supply. There is concern over the eventual 
dwindling oil resources aggravated by the simultaneous inability to create a strong 
manufacturing, agriculture or service sector and an overdependence on migrant labour.5 
These pressing circumstances compelled the government of Brunei to formulate an 
alternative plan that would help maintain the high standard of living in Brunei for its 
citizens. But drafting such a plan was not straightforward. 
Firstly, the economic returns on the non-oil and gas sector were low because the 
government’s resources and infrastructure existed solely to support the industrial drilling 
of oil. Secondly, the citizens of Brunei had comprehensive welfare schemes with free 
healthcare, housing and education, preferential employment in the public sector with very 
high remunerations and interest free loans. Hence the citizens’ attitudes had to be 
addressed before they could be expected to take high risks when a comfortable, effortless 
life was already guaranteed.6 The government also introduced regulations to reduce the 
inflow of the immigrant population, which occupied a substantial share of the working 
population in Brunei. The government thus hoped to decrease the unemployment rate 
amongst the local citizens and reduce the size of the burgeoning public sector. However 
the number of immigrants entering and working in Brunei showed little sign of decline.  
Eventually, the decision to restrict the influx of low-skilled migrant laborers was 
revealed to be a policy miscalculation for several reasons. By 1990, out of a labor force 
of 87,000, more than half were still foreign workers.7 First, the growing unemployment 
amongst the Bruneians was voluntary. Given the luxuries of the public sector, citizens 
were unlikely to seek employment in the private sector, which predominantly employed 
migrant workers. The only jobs that the Malay Muslims desired in the private sector were 
those held by Western expatriates who had enviable jobs in a handful of multinational 
corporations in Brunei. The great majority of foreign workers to Brunei however fulfilled 
                                                 
4 Tarling, Nicholas. Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III and Britain: The Making of Brunei Darussalam. Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford UP, 1995.  
5 Horton, AVM. A New Sketch of the History of Negera Brunei Darussalam. United Kingdom: 1995 
6 Cleary M and Eaton, P. Borneo: Change and Development. Singapore: Oxford UP, 1992. 
7 Economic Planning Unit, Brunei Darussalam Key Indicators. 1990. 
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the jobs that Bruneians considered ‘below their dignity.’8 As a result, Brunei’s private 
citizens are “dependent on migrant workers for 74% of [their] manpower needs [needs].”9 
On a side note, despite their considerable importance to the country’s economy, if not 
most basic functioning, these workers reap very few economic or social rewards for their 
services. 
The presence of a huge migrant population and the close geographical proximity 
to a culturally similar Malaysia exacerbated important identity issues for Brunei. It 
compelled the revived formation of a unique and distinct state ideology to the Bruneian 
nation based on Monarchy, Islam and Malayness, more popularly known as MIB (Melayu 
Islam Beraja) on its independence in 1984, although, it was only thoroughly enunciated 
by the Sultan himself on his forth-fourth birthday in 1990.10-11 The MIB articulates a 
particular view of the past history and tradition that brings prestige to the current State 
and its ruler by re-creating a glorious and unique Bruneian Identity.12  According to the 
Government of Brunei, the MIB ideology dated back to 100 CE.13 Ironically, the advent 
of Islam into Brunei occurred some time after 1400 CE.14 Moreover, the MIB concept has 
also shown itself to be innovative as much as preservative.15 
The national philosophy and way of life in Brunei is said to rely on this state 
ideology: “The MIB concept can be formalized as a concept which upholds Islamic 
values based on the Quran and the Hadith as basis of all activities concerning the racial 
necessity, language, Malay culture and monarchy institution as the governing system and 
administration of Brunei.”16 Although the official religion of Brunei is Islam and the 
Sultan is the head of the faith in the country, the MIB functions as an instrument 
upholding the traditional structure of governance and culture of Brunei.17 Through its 
constant and thorough dissemination in schools and professional training programs, this 
                                                 
8 Abdullah, Mariam. “Personal Interview.” 10 January 2008. 
9 Jayasankaran, S. “A King’s Ransom.” Far Eastern Economic Review, Feb. 2003: 46. 
10 Horton, AVM. A New Sketch of the History of Negera Brunei Darassalam. United Kingdom: 1995. 
11 Saunders, Graham. A History of Brunei. Kuala Lumpur. Oxford UP: 1994. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Athukorala, Premachandra. “International Labour Migration in the Asian-Pacific Region: patterns, 
policies and  economic implications.” Asia – Pacific Economic Literature. 7 (2005): 28-57. 
14 Hasan. Haji. Amin. History of Brunei in Brief. Brunei: Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports. 2000. 
15 Horton, AVM. Turun-Temurun: A Dissection of Negera Brunei Darussalam. United Kingdom: 1996. 
16 Borneo Bulletin 1996. 
17 Singh, Ranjit, and Sidhu, Jatswan. Historical Dictionary of Brunei Darussalam. London: Scarecrow 
Press, 1997. 
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ideology has preserved Brunei’s so-called traditional values in order for the political elite 
to uphold and justify the traditional monarchy.18 In this context, the Sultan is both the 
monarch and the religious leader in Brunei. In fact, religion is regularly invoked in many 
everyday contexts. For example, improving public transport in Brunei was said to be a 
‘religious duty’ in a past issue of the English language daily.19 
 With the explicit desire to protect the traditional monarchy and its citizen 
population, the government launched its initial programs to reduce its dependence on 
foreign labour. Those labour policies incorporated important educational reforms and 
employment policies that had profound implications for women in Brunei. For Bruneian 
women, this change meant emerging from traditional familial expectations to fulfill new 
social roles as workers and even businesswomen. The proportion of women, which 
constituted a quarter of the work force by 1975, increased from 31 percent (1991) to 54 
percent (1995) and has been increasing ever since.20 At the time of writing, almost half of 
the small and medium enterprises in Brunei are owned and/or run by women. 
Women performed surprisingly well in the employment market, and they also 
dominated in institutes of higher education. Female university graduates formed almost 
two-thirds of Brunei University's entering class.21-22 The high rate of participation of 
women in education and economy of Brunei was noteworthy amongst oil-rich Islamic 
monarchies in the world.23 Most mainstream feminist discourses generally argue that 
education and active participation in the economy are quantitative indicators of women’s 
capacities towards gender equality within their countries. Significant to this development 
of women’s social mobility through waged labor was the expansion and accessibility of 
education for Brunei women that was initiated since the seventies. Given the above 
statistics, it would be tempting to conclude that Malay Muslim women in Brunei live in 
one of the most progressive countries in Southeast Asia, possibly on par with countries 
like Singapore. 
To the keen observer, it is evident that the economic position of women in Brunei 
                                                 
18 Education in Brunei Darussalam: An Outline. Bandar Seri Begawan: Ministry of Education, 1985. 
19 Borneo Bulletin. April, 1997. 
20 “Brunei Darussalam: Recent Economic Developments.” IMF Staff Country Report 99/19.April 1999.  
21 Brunei University was the only university in the country. 
22 The Advancement of Women in ASEAN, A regional Report. 1996. ASEAN Secretariat.  
23 Abdeljalil, Akkari 'Education in the Middle East and North Africa: The Current Situation and Future 
Challenges', International Educational Journal, 5 (2004). 
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has improved since they became increasing significant as contributors to the financial 
positions of their families. Urban educated women participate in the labour force in two 
ways, either as employees of governmental bureaucracy or as entrepreneurs of small 
ventures. However, most Brunei women treat the public sector as the employment of 
choice for its welfare benefits and high wages. Hence most educated women get absorbed 
into this sector.  By the late 90s, the public sector had become too bloated for the state to 
absorb all of its citizens, particularly women with higher education. When there was a job 
squeeze in the public sector and in the civil service, women were the first to be 
encouraged to take up voluntary retirement. To mitigate widespread unemployment 
amongst the above class of women, the government encouraged small businesses as an 
avenue for alternate income generation.   
While the education and employment achievements of Malay Muslim women in 
Brunei are good indicators of their improving economic position within Brunei, it 
informs us little about the aspirations of these women. For example, those sole indicators 
cannot explain many things like the changes in traditional family life or the political 
implications of the economic progress of women. There is indeed more to learn about 
these women than what their present economic status suggests, and this research intends 
to locate the aspects of their desires that escape statistics and mainstream quantitative 
analysis.  
In order to be able to articulate those desires, I chose to study a sample of middle-
aged businesswomen in the WBC. This organization was a top-down initiative set up in 
2001 as an infrastructure for women’s entry into small scale business. Nevertheless, the 
WBC did not evolve as it was meant to be. In the end, women had to be resilient and 
independent from the state for survival and success in their enterprises. Originally, these 
businesswomen were former civil servants and the WBC was formed by state patronage, 
yet this research uncovered marginal spaces where these women worked within the 
informal network of the WBC to circumnavigate some government-imposed regulations.  
Unlike a modern organizational structure with the entitlement to negotiate or 
lobby the state for member’s interests and rights, the WBC operated more as an informal 
network or a sorority for these businesswomen. The informality of the network gave rise 
to unique strategies upon which women had to depend that could be understood as 
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‘illegal’ or ‘subversive’ in nature. They chose such strategies usually the case when the 
state failed to help them or even presented itself as an obstacle to their success. 
With this wider background, my research seeks to answer: How can we interpret 
the experiences of the members of a specific women’s organization, the Women’s 
Business Council, as a refashioning of a new two-way relationship between the 
government Brunei and some of its urban educated Malay Muslim women who started 
businesses? 
  
Why Brunei, Why me? 
 
 During the past two years of my research on Brunei as a Masters student at the 
National University of Singapore, I often had to answer a recurrent question: Why was I 
studying Brunei? It was obvious to my professors, family and friends that I was not 
Bruneian, neither had I ever lived there, nor had I learnt much about Brunei before I came 
to this university. In fact, I did not even have the privilege of being acquainted with a 
single Bruneian. I usually dismissed their queries by claiming a specific interest in 
women’s lives in Brunei emanating from my general interest in the lives of women in 
Muslim countries. In retrospect, I recollect that none of my responses sounded genuine 
enough to convince anyone of my real motivations. To many, it may have seemed like I 
had stretched a fleeting pre-occupation for too long.  
 To a large extent their concern over my superficial motivations was valid. I 
myself was beginning to be persuaded that perhaps I was not really passionate about 
researching this subject. How could I produce meaningful scholarship on a subject about 
which I was unwilling to think deeply, and more importantly, sincerely, about? Figuring 
my own interest in this research topic was the missing link to my otherwise challenging 
thesis. Why do I care so much about the plight of Malay Muslim women in Brunei? Why 
do I want to learn more about them? I spent many long hours in introspection over my 
underlying motivations for studying Brunei, and finally I realized that I knew it all along. 
I was just not ready to share it. 
Somewhere hidden beneath my drive to produce objective and substantial 
scholarship was a very personal issue at stake. For the longest time, I was insecure and 
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ashamed to declare that my interest emanated from a small, yet potent, human emotion: 
envy. 
 I still recollect the day my close friend and me received our acceptation letter 
from universities in the United States. We both got accepted to some prestigious 
undergraduate programs that we both could not afford to go to with our own means. 
Despite this apparent disincentive, we heard that the King of Dubai was offering 
scholarships to all permanent residents who had gained acceptance but demonstrated 
financial need. So we were delighted. 
 When I eventually read the fine print on the applications, it was evident that the 
applicants needed to be United Arab Emirates citizens, which I was not. This made all the 
difference. I could not afford to go to those schools since I did not qualify for that 
scholarship opportunity as a non-citizen. Today, I still remember that day vividly because 
it was the first time I realized the worth of being a citizen. My parents were immigrants to 
Dubai and, regardless of the many years spent there and my attachment to this new home, 
I would never become a citizen. It dawned on me that all my Arab friends would have the 
opportunity to go to great schools and acquire great jobs as their birthright. On the other 
hand, my birthright awarded no such free benefits. Despite having lived there all my life, 
I could not qualify for scholarships or job opportunities or loans that are handed on a 
platter to citizens. Yes, I was envious.  
 At this moment, I had decided that, in order to heal my inferiority complex and 
grow to appreciate who I really am, I needed to understand the choices and problems of 
those privileged Arab women in the UAE. I needed to learn about their lives before being 
assured that they were categorically more privileged than me. If such was my intention, 
why did I not study the UAE?  
 There were two significant reasons for this choice. The more tangible one was 
that there was little written on the lives of women in the UAE, with the exception of 
occasional statistics on their educational or employment achievements. In comparison 
with other Southeast Asian countries, one could argue that Brunei is relatively under-
studied. Yet mildly critical studies on Brunei are still more prevalent in academic 
discourse than those on the UAE.  
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Secondly, I was aware of my limitations as a young scholar. I was not yet capable 
of disallowing my prejudices to unduly cloud my scholarship on the Arab women in the 
UAE. Under the given circumstances, the continuous history of problematic interactions 
and my explicit identity as an immigrant to their country, interactive fieldwork would be 
very difficult for anyone in my position. After all, few anthropologists study subjects or 
women more powerful than themselves. This compelling reason spelled my choice to 
study Brunei. 
 While I had never lived in Brunei, I had lived in a very comparable country. The 
United Arab Emirates was a small oil-rich Islamic country nestled in the Middle-East. 
Like the UAE, Brunei was ruled by a dictatorial monarch too. Arabs of certain tribal 
lineage enjoy comprehensive welfare privileges in the UAE, much like the Malay 
Muslims in Brunei. Both these countries also have a predominant population of 
expatriates and immigrants from other countries. They have spent many generations as 
denizens without any claim to citizenship or welfare. In both these countries, the non-
citizens could never belong to either of these countries, because citizenship was awarded 
by default of hereditary membership to a few select clans only.  
 I felt that given the important similarities between the UAE and Brunei, this 
small Southeast Asian country allowed me to study a different yet paradigmatically 
similar country. The position of these Malay Muslim women was very much like those of 
the Arab women in the UAE. While it would have made logical sense to study the plight 
of the Chinese immigrants of Brunei, I did not have the imagination, language or 
knowledge base to study or compare their situation to mine. However, as I had not lived 
in Brunei and did not possess an immediate identity as a citizen or immigrant to this 
country, I was capable of maintaining an objective distance yet remain as dedicated to 
learn more about the lives of these privileged Malay Muslim women in Brunei.  
My research on Brunei was one of the most soul-searching experiences of my life. 
I learnt that feelings like envy or pity for people were hard to emote unless I actually 
knew the circumstances and range of choices those people had. I came to realize that 
Malay Muslim women were undoubtedly privileged in Brunei. Yet when I ploughed into 
their personal stories and experiences, it became apparent that even their lives were laden 
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with dissatisfactions. Perhaps one could call them ungrateful, as I would have been 
tempted to, had I been my previous immature self.  
These women suffered frustrations too regarding their capacity to lead the life 
they ideally wished to lead. This realization turned out to be the most heartbreaking and 
simultaneously the most wonderful insight I gathered from this academic excursion. 
While I learnt a lot about the experiences and frustrations of women in Brunei, I learnt a 
lot more about myself. In those many months of questioning my motivations, studying 
about women in Brunei and learning to become honest with myself, I learnt the most 
valuable lesson about my profoundly hidden purpose for studying them. I had finally 
begun to appreciate my own privileges and respect my position as an immigrant in the 
UAE instead of apologizing for or loathing it.  
While I was pre-occupied with self-pity about my inability to acquire a UAE 
government scholarship, I forgot to appreciate the fact that I did end up acquiring a 
wonderful and meaningful undergraduate degree in the United States and a masters in 
Singapore on merit scholarships. In those selfish moments not only was I idealizing 
someone inappropriately, I was also simultaneously disrespecting my own efforts and 
achievements.  
I believe that this would be the right moment to quote one of my favourite cultural 
anthropologists and renowned Cuban feminist literary critic, Ruth Behar, who once said 
about the role of personal life experiences in academic scholarship that “Anthropology 
that does not break your heart is just not worth doing anymore.” 24 
This modest anthropological excursion did break my heart only to make it more 
resilient. It taught me that these women, whom I had ignorantly idealized, were just as 
happy or as miserable or as hopeful as I could be about leading the lives which we choose 
to lead. I will always remain grateful to this educational experience for teaching me to 
accept and become comfortable with my position as an immigrant to the UAE and more 
importantly as a citizen of the new world.  
This was my sincere motivation to study Brunei. Perhaps I have occasionally 
succumbed to human errs by getting carried away by my irrational emotions, subjective 
feelings or ignorant prejudices, but I have identified and declared whenever I have 
                                                 
24 Behar, Ruth. The Vulnerable Observer: Anthropology that breaks your heart. Boston: Beacon Press, 1997 
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recognized them to be so. In other words, while I cannot promise my study shall reveal 
the truth, I do promise it shall be truthful.  
 
The Relevance of the Women’s Business Council  
 
Given that Brunei is a welfare monarchy that awards free education to all its 
citizens and the government employs over 60 percent of the working population, it is 
difficult to methodologically link the personal aspirations of Malay Muslim women to 
achievements in employment and education.25  
In order to make the links, I thought it best to find a group of women who had 
explicitly made career decisions that could allow me to note their capacity to be 
independent from the government for their economic position. Such a task would be 
enormous to undertake given the time and resources at hand unless I narrowed down my 
subject group.  
Although it was initially difficult to recognize a sizable number of women who 
were not explicitly dependent on the government for their education and employment 
needs, I was able to locate a selection of urban working women in Brunei who were no 
longer directly dependent on the government for their economic position: the 
entrepreneurial women in Brunei.  
The anxiousness over the changing economic fortunes of Brunei led the state to 
change its public policy in the nineties. Since 1995, the Sultan of Brunei announced 
certain measures to reduce his country’s dependence on oil. One such measure was to 
develop a strong private sector through the encouragement of small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) amongst Malay Muslim citizens. During the period, the government 
developed many loan schemes, funded training programs and organized workshops to 
encourage high achieving government employees to embark on business opportunities. 
These policies led to the creation of a significant number of new SMEs in Brunei at the 
                                                 
25 Brunei is an independent sovereign Sultanate which is governed on the basis of a written Constitution. 
The Sultan is the supreme executive authority in Brunei Darussalam. His Majesty has occupied the position 
of Prime Minister since resumption of independence in 1984. His Majesty has followed a combination of 
traditional and reforming policies, moving away from a structure of a Chief Minister and State Secretary to 
a full ministerial system with specified portfolios. All the important executive decisions are taken only by 
the Sultan. 
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dawn of the twenty-first century. 
This government initiative to encourage entrepreneurs coupled with pre-existing 
favourable economic circumstances cultivated by a high wage public sector working 
culture had led to the emergence of a unique class of educated urban middle-aged 
businesswomen. These women were undeniably a product of a rare combination of public 
policy and common social experiences.  
While all workingwomen in Brunei could be considered to be a product of policy 
and social factors, the key distinction between these women and entrepreneurial women 
was that the latter were not employees of the government. The government of Brunei 
created a national women’s organization called the Women’s Business Council to 
recognize their growing importance to the economy of Brunei, while most other national 
women’ organizations in Brunei were created for women who had more direct 
professional and personal links with the government. The WBC, like the other women’s 
organizations, was a top-down initiative with few official powers or capacities to 
negotiate with the government.  
Not surprisingly, given the patriarchal monarchic nature of Brunei, the actual 
powers of this organization, like all the other national women’ organizations in Brunei, to 
directly negotiate with the government is limited. The WBC was unable to become 
instrumental in forging of strong symbiotic relationships of any tangible economic or 
political consequence amongst businesswomen in any explicit way. However, it did enjoy 
representation in the public sphere and all high level parties.  I shall elaborate on the 
history of their creation, the exact nature of their activities and the uniqueness of the 
WBC in my first chapter. This difference in the relationship that businesswomen shared 
with the government allowed the business community members of the WBC to gain an 
alternative perspective on the role of government in their future wellbeing. They were not 
complacent or satisfied with the role that the government played in their careers.26 Often, 
despite the government’s rare yet weary public acknowledgment of its own 
ineffectiveness in its ability to support SMEs in Brunei, the WBC continues to be 
consistently publicly recognized as being significant contributors to the Brunei economy.  
Ironically, while the government is implicitly aware of its inability to intervene or 
                                                 
26 I shall elaborate in Chapter 4. 
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constructively support women’s businesses, it nevertheless wants them to succeed and 
fulfil Brunei’s larger economic goals. The desire yet inability of the government to ensure 
these women to have successful businesses thus questions whether the Brunei as a 
welfare-state is as capable as it used to be in appeasing the demands of all its Malay 
Muslim citizens.   
The pressing tension of rising unemployment amongst educated citizens coupled 
with inherent male chauvinism despite a predominance of educated women in that labour 
pool gave rise to circumstances favourable for the government aided self-employment of 
women. Hence the government created this necessary yet problematic organization, and 
this origin was a unique characteristic of the WBC. 
The study of these businesswomen will help us observe any form of political 
reformation in monarchic countries. I had to look for those non-governmental actors who 
were capable of exercising opinions contradictory to those of the State yet who were still 
acknowledged as legitimate actors in the public sphere. My study argues that the 
experiences of women within a top-down initiative of the Brunei government such as the 
WBC, provides one such space for para-political negotiations between subjects and the 
Brunei State.  
Unlike a modern political organizations with the capacity to lobby the state for 
member’s interests and rights, the WBC operated more as a sorority for these 
businesswomen. The informality of the network gave rise to unprecedented strategies that 
were subversive in nature but upon which women had to depend. This was their situation 
as these businesswomen were unable to depend on the state to help them out.  
This was why I chose to re-conceptualize state-citizen relationships in Brunei via 
the experiences of select range of businesswomen members of the WBC – a state-created 
organisation yet one in which the state remains invisible in its activities and private actors 
(women entrepreneurs) have taken on the main role. 
I have taken citizenship to primarily signify the political rights of an individual 
within a nation. While it may seem oxymoronic to seek for political rights for Malay 
Muslim denizens in Bruneian monarchy, I beg to differ. To assume that the citizens of 
Brunei have few political rights does not imply that they have no leverage over their 
government at all. We certainly cannot safely conclude that Monarchic regimes are 
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stagnant political structures. 
My study seeks to highlight how middle-aged businesswomen – all of whom were 
members of the WBC – were affected by the government’s changing policies during the 
late nineties before they ventured into their own businesses. The WBC was the top-down 
organization formed by state patronage although it was of marginal effectiveness in 
assisting the businesses of these women.  
Unlike a modern organizational structure with the entitlement to negotiate or 
lobby the state for member’s interests and rights. While it might have been convenient to 
make decisions that corresponded with government policy, I intend to explore how a 
complementary series of social and personal factors also simultaneously supported these 
middle-aged Malay Muslim woman’s forays into business. For instance, their perceptions 
of the alternative employment options, collective labour bargaining capacities, personal 
aspirations and pre-existing impressions of entrepreneurship amongst older Malay 
Muslim businesswomen played a significant role in concurrently rendering 
entrepreneurship as a better alternative source of livelihood.   
While the WBC was ineffective in helping women alter legislations or financial 
policies of the State in its favour, it was instrumental in creating an informal network or a 
sorority of businesswomen who recognize the interrelated nature of their economic 
interests. These women disseminate subversive and secretive information based on trust 
that effectively assists their entrepreneurial endeavours in crucial ways. This is one way 
in which this thesis highlights how the Malay Muslim businesswomen in the WBC create 
a desirable position for themselves by negotiating government policies and the prevailing 
social norms to their favour. 
         In the process, I wish to reveal that in Brunei, the relationship between the 
businesswomen in the WBC and the government is more complicated than the 
relationship between women in the public sector and the government. I argue that the 
economic position of businesswomen in Brunei is not dependent on the government and 
that this economic position earned over the years was much unlike the predicament of a 
great majority of working Malay Muslims in Brunei. This case study thereby explicates 
one such unprecedented repercussion of the hidden tension emerging along gender lines 




I was a postgraduate student at the Department of Southeast Asian Studies, 
National University of Singapore, when I undertook this research. I carried out my 
fieldwork in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, from December 2007 to January 2008. 
Although I was not born in Brunei, I have lived a majority of my life in a political 
economy much like it in the Middle East. Hence, my fieldwork was partially an excursion 
into an “other’s” land and partially a zone of familiarity. I also had previous experience in 
conducting a short ethnographic project studying the changes in academic and public 
conceptualizations of the matriarchal tribe Minangkabau in Sumatra and Negri Sembilan.  
As little has been written on women in Brunei, I primarily depended on country 
statistics, prevalent studies on Brunei’s political economy, and incorporated their relevant 
findings into my research. I juxtaposed this theoretical underpinning with my own 
interactions with select female members of the older Malay Muslim community of Brunei 
from the Women’ Business Council, Women’s Council of Brunei, alumni graduate 
students, Ministry employees and other middle-aged educated urban working women. 
Given the general lack of critical scholarship on any aspect of Brunei, I also used a large 
variety of secondary sources to document the current political, economic, social 
happenings occurring within the Brunei.  
I initially emphasized my interest in how these businesswomen adroitly navigated 
through traditional social and cultural expectations as they made such swift strides into 
the public sphere of Brunei. With my second and third interviews with the same woman, 
I usually developed a deeper relationship with her. This trust enabled my respondents to 
confide more controversial ideas in exchange for my guarantee of their anonymity. 
 At the beginning, attaining access to potential interviewees was my biggest 
challenge. Once I had earned the trust of a few key members of the WBC, the task 
became significantly easier. Brunei’s elite women’ organizations were a well-connected 
network of women often related to each other.  My own knowledge of their experiences 
allowed them to discuss issues shared by someone who had lived through similar social 
and political circumstances as Brunei.  
I also casually interacted with Malay Muslim university students and 
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workingwomen closer to my own age group.27 While their experiences and motivations 
were not directly related to my research, it definitely helped me contextualize the stories 
that I had gathered of middle-aged businesswomen. It would be misguided to present the 
views and opinions of the Malay Muslim women I interviewed to be representative of 
Malay Muslim women in Brunei in general.  
I took rigorous Bahasa Melayu classes at the National University of Singapore for 
three semesters in order to be equipped to effectively communicate with my interviewees. 
However, since bilingual medium of education (Malay and English) was made mandatory 
since the seventies in all government schools, my satisfactory yet limited knowledge of 
Malay was fortunately not a handicap. Even the oldest women spoke fluent English 
peppered with an occasional ‘macam’ and frequent ‘lah’. 
I was sensitive to my subject position as an anthropologist who exercised power 
in her representation of Bruneian society. Another issue that could be raised is the time-
period of my fieldwork. I only had a month to conduct all my interviews and gather all 
the field information that informed the basis of this work. Brunei’s visa requirement to 
citizens from countries such as India, where my passport comes from, is restricted. 
Clearing the necessary paperwork and being granted permission to stay for over a month 
took over six months to complete. While I was genuinely elated to have been able to 
enter Brunei at all, I had to simultaneously compromise with the time I had on the field. 
In order to limit the disadvantage this would pose to my study, I have defined my 
topic in a way that allows it to be less dependent on ethnographies. My study primarily 
rethinks the reigning conceptualization of women and citizenship in Brunei. Hence I only 
used my detailed interviews to illustrate a possibility of how alternative understanding of 
political evolutions in the context of Brunei can be understood.  
After all, the positive fieldwork for this study was limited to little more than a 
month. While technically my study focused on the general experiences of the 
businesswomen in the WBC, I do not wish to assert the views of my informants as 
universally applicable to all the members. However, the ideas, aspirations and opinions 
                                                 
27 I am very thankful to my group of Bruneian friends who I met at Gadong Supermall on several occasions 
to relieve the loneliness I felt and connect with my own age group.  I am grateful for their candid opinions, 
unlimited ambuyats, keuhs and satays and the infinite humorous narrations of mainstream discourse of 
various kinds in Brunei that they shared with me. My interactions with them constantly reassured me that 
dynamic and progressive changes are in store for Brunei.  
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that I discussed were representative of a small proportion of the WBC’s members, fifteen 
out of fifty. I selected my main narratives based on the degree of affinity, openness and 
the extent of details some of the women chose to go into regarding their personal lives. 
I do not claim the generalizability of this research as I only spoke to fifteen 
women whom I arbitrarily chose out of a potential 20,000 businesswomen. This work is 
more a case study as a preliminary research into the social circumstances and personal 
motivations of women who choose to go into businesses in Brunei. I chose to do case 
studies rather than a more sociological and representative study due to my short 
fieldwork period. In addition, it was nearly impossible to ascertain how many real active 
Malay Muslim businesswomen there were in Brunei and it would be hard to know what 
sample size would be representative of this population.  
While some facts revealed around 20,000 such businesses, it was unclear how 
many were Malay Muslim women (as businesses were also owned by Chinese or Malay 
Muslim men). There was also a common ‘ali baba’ concept of businesses in Brunei with 
co-ownership by Chinese and other immigrants apart from Malay Muslims. Some of 
these set-ups were known for money laundering and taking huge loans from the 
government and banks only to vanish without repayment: “As many as half of the total 
number of Brunei-Malay businesses in the Sultanate may be officially registered in name 
only.”28  I was also aware that many of the businesses, although owned by Malay Muslim 
women on paper, were actively run by someone else.  
The businesswomen in the WBC were the only group of active entrepreneurs I 
could approach with my research as they had a website at the time.29  I reiterate here that 
I will merely represent the views of a few middle-aged businesswomen via my case 
studies and not generalize their experience as representing the experiences of the majority 
of businesswomen in Brunei. My thesis will only hint at potential theoretical conclusions 
that could be reached from the correlation between my interactions with a few 
businesswomen, statistical findings and personal interests.   
 
Chapters Outline 
                                                 
28 Anonymous. Ali Babas rule Malay Muslim businesses. www..bruneidirect.com. 
29 Interestingly since, that IP address is for sale. 
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  In chapter two, I justify my choice of studying the Women’ Business Council of 
Brunei. The WBC was the newest addition to national women’s organizations in Brunei. 
We will observe how the basis for its creation, in many ways, was unlike any previously 
existing women’s organization in Brunei. Its emergence is crucial for the illustration of 
my hypothesis. I bring into the same analytical framework the political rationale of the 
Brunei government to increase its dependence on these women by initiating specific 
policy initiatives with the personal preferences and dynamics that shaped these women’s 
responses to those public policy initiatives. Before the creation of this organization, it 
was difficult to find educated working women who embodied the split between state-
infused identity as a subject of a welfare state and her personal identity shaped by her 
unique socio-economic position as an entrepreneur within Brunei.  
In chapter three, I elaborate on the ways in which members of the WBC 
converted and negotiated with traditional social mores to effectively further their 
professional ambitions.  In fact, I assert that their very ability to change their careers 
constituted the product of their consistent and dynamic negotiations between the rigid 
structures of the monarchic State, limited choices of professional careers and traditional 
familial obligations in Brunei. This way, I am able to redeem their agency, (however 
over-used or problematic the terminology may have become), without romanticizing it or 
ignoring how they produced their unique position within the otherwise normative 
tendencies of the Malay Islamic monarchy of Brunei. I conclude that the creation of such 
a mobile, independent, creative and skilled class of Malay Muslims was itself the 
combined result of a well-accepted older public policy, personal and cultural motivations.  
 In chapter four, the public policies of the nineties aimed at diversifying the 
economy through the development of businesses in a range of fields are discussed. This 
chapter intends to understand how did a unique class of educated middle-aged Malay 
Muslim businesswomen emerge at the time? First of all, the government forced educated 
women into the public sector workforce to reduce its dependence on migrant labor. By 
the nineties, there public sector was too bloated and there was a strong state initiative to 
reduce its size. This time corresponded with when most middle-aged Malay Muslim 
women started their small businesses.  
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 I adopt a two-pronged investigation into the employment-related circumstances and 
the personal motivations of the members to hypothesize how they were able to become 
entrepreneurs. I conclude that the members of the WBC were not merely complying with 
public policies of the government nor were they only selfishly exploiting favourable 
shifts in Brunei’s public policy as chapter one may have prematurely suggested. The 
reality is more a combination of both factors. 
In chapter five, by exploring the strategies and tactics employed by the 
businesswomen to solve their own problems and the reasons why they found it 
worthwhile to participate in the WBC, some critical implications come to light. The 
WBC businesswomen had emerged as an economic class with a unique relationship with 
the government because they fulfill the government’s wish to expand the private sector 
and to reduce the state’s burden as main employer in the country. The findings in this 
chapter reinstate the main argument of this thesis on the emergence of businesswomen as 
an emerging social-economic group with a unique relationship within the government 
because they were created by, yet also independent from, the government. This chapter 
highlights how members of the WBC thrive on their own despite and not because of 
government assistance even though the businesses were created from the help of 
government policies. 
This last chapter reinforced the fact that although I was able to demonstrate how 
urban educated workingwomen in Brunei were able to negotiate a better position for 
themselves via their newly acquired skills as businesswomen, they are still a minority 
population of women citizens in Brunei.  Under no circumstances can we confuse the 
position of entrepreneurial women in Brunei with those of the majority of urban educated 
Malay Muslim women in Brunei who are mainly government employees in the public 
sector. In fact many of the businesswomen in the WBC themselves were conscious of 
their definite divergence in priorities in comparison with the workingwomen in Brunei.  
Finally, I wonder if this ability of Malay Muslim entrepreneurial women in the 
WBC to demarcate themselves as a unique group within the general population of Malay 
Muslim women would lead to tensions in the future of Brunei’s political economy. After 
all, the imposed sense of economic security that the citizens of Brunei experiences cannot 
last longer than their oil unless the private non-oil related businesses in Brunei began to 
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thrive. I complete this research by further exploring the consequences of such a 






























Juxtaposing the WBC with National Women’s Organizations 
in Brunei 
 
Background of Bruneian society  
 
 The Sultanate of Brunei is an oil-rich monarchy nestled in the island of Borneo in 
Southeast Asia. It acquired its sovereignty from the British in 1984 and has a small but 
well-off population of over 350,000 people today.30 The demography of this country is 
dominated by Malay Muslims who constitute 68 percent of the population. Other 
indigenous peoples such as the Kadayan, Bisaya, Lun Bawang, Dusun, Iban and Penan 
make up about 5 percent.31 The ethnic Chinese minority comprises approximately 18 per 
cent of the population and immigrant workers from other Southeast Asian countries form 
the remaining percentage as significant minorities.32  
Although Brunei has an autonomous government headed by the Sultan, it relies 
heavily on its Malay-Muslim population as its base of legitimacy. Other sections of the 
population are intentionally kept out of the national core by being denied citizenship 
despite having stayed in Brunei for several generations.33  
While Malay Muslims are clearly the privileged ethnic group of Brunei, the 
government of Brunei rigidly regulates the formation of public associations amongst this 
ethnic group. The government of Brunei allows only one political party to operate in the 
country, that is, the Brunei Solidarity National Party (PPKB).34  
 Even the activities of well-known international service organizations such as 
Rotary, Kiwanis, and the Lions that function in every many other Southeast Asian 
                                                 
30 UNICEF. Demographics, Brunei Darassalam. Total population (thousands) in 2006 – 382,000 
31 Horton, AVM. A New Sketch of the History of Negera Brunei Darassalam. United Kingdom: 1995 
32 Singh, Ranjit, and Sidhu,Jatswan. Historical Dictionary of Brunei Darussalam. London: Scarecrow Press, 
1997. 
33Cleary M. and Wong Shuang Yang, “Diversification Problems in a Rentier State: The Case of Brunei.”  
Pacific Viewpoint. 34 (1993): 69-76. 
34 Singh, Ranjit, and Sidhu,Jatswan. Historical Dictionary of Brunei Darussalam. London: Scarecrow Press, 
1997. However this political party existed only in name since the Parliament has been suspended following 
the Monarch’s declaration of a constant State of Emergency since the 1962. 
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countries as elite social network groups continue to be restricted by the Brunei 
government.35 Any non-governmental organization which seeks to operate in Brunei has 
to apply for permission under the Companies Act. Moreover local leaders of non-
governmental organizations have been regularly warned against having Muslim 
members.36  
 From the above description, the avenues for Malay Muslims to form public 
organizations and associations in Brunei seem limited. However, to ensure that social 
organizations exist exclusively for Malay Muslim citizens, the government has created 
many exclusive national organizations for them. These organizations include several 
social organizations particularly for educated and professional Malay Muslim women. 
These women’s organizations symbolize the government’s support of Malay Muslim 
women in Brunei’s formal public sphere. These educated and professional Malay Muslim 




This thesis concentrates on the establishment of one particular women’s 
organization in 2000, the Brunei Business Women’s Council (WBC). The WBC was 
established by the government of Brunei in recognition and appreciation of the fact that 
almost 50 percent of the small and medium enterprises in Brunei at that time were owned 
and/or managed by Malay Muslim women.37 Its creation signified the State’s support of 
its female citizens, i.e. Malay-Muslim women, to venture into business in Brunei. This 
chapter explores the ways in which the WBC facilitates Malay-Muslim women to use 
their status as businesswomen to exert their citizenship rights to demand for official 
recognition as a special social category and financial support from the state of Brunei. I 
                                                 
35 These service oriented organizations are located all over the world. They are non-religious organization 
and open to all persons regardless of race, color or creed. There are more than 32,000 clubs and over 1.2 
million members world-wide. The stated purpose of such organizations was to bring together business and 
professional leaders to provide humanitarian service, encourage high ethical standards in all vocations, and 
help build goodwill and peace in the world. Members usually meet weekly for breakfast, lunch or dinner, 
which were social events as well as an opportunity to organize work on their service goals. 
36 Horton, AVM. Turun-Temurun: A Dissection of Negera Brunei Darussalam. United Kingdom: 1996. 
37 Wimalatissa, WA. “The Emerging Class of Businesswomen and Women-owned businesses in Brunei.” 
Journal of Enterprising Culture. 4 (1996): 287-300. 
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argue that the WBC departs from pre-existing national women’s organizations in Brunei 
in at least four significant ways: in its objectives, its type of activities, its leadership and 
its basis of creation. In the process, I will show how the government’s interest in 
establishing the WBC differs significantly from the organization’s latter goals.  
My thesis will show the symbiotic relationship between WBC members and the 
government in which both sides fulfill each other’s aims and stand to gain in their 
reciprocal relationship. While actors, such as the government and the members of the 
WBC, needed each other for their mutual long term prosperity, apart from the early 
government support given in terms of incentives to help women start their own business, 
as an organization, the WBC took on newer strategies for helping themselves. The 
organization did not try to influence government policies. Rather it became an 
organization offering contacts and support amongst its members in order to cope with 
their business woes. At times, the WBC members also tried to circumvent state policies 
through illegal business activities.  
 Before I begin with comparing the circumstances behind the creation, objectives 
and functioning of the WBC from other women’s associations in Brunei, I would like to 
emphasize that there are limited academic publications on national organizations in 
Brunei. This limitation makes the task of retracing the history, goal and official 
objectives of these women’s organizations in Brunei quite challenging. To alleviate this 
difficulty, I will base my comparison using my fieldwork findings as well as a variety of 
information from official organizational brochures, press releases and newspaper articles 
on women’s organizations in Brunei which I have documented. I will undertake a 
historical overview of the WBC’s creation and its uniqueness in comparison with other 
national women’s organizations in Brunei. I will occasionally inject in my analysis 
relevant perceptions, opinions and ideas from members of the WBC and occasionally 






History: The Women’s Business Council (WBC) 
 
By the mid-nineties, like many other Brunei citizens, Malay Muslim women were 
largely employees of the Brunei public work force. However, their overt dependence on 
the government for jobs created problems as there were simply not enough jobs in the 
public sector for all Malay Muslim women in Brunei. By the late 1990s, the threat of high 
unemployment rates amongst younger Malay Muslim women in Brunei seemed 
imminent.  
To address this potential unemployment crisis, the Brunei government 
implemented new public policies to diversify the economy and expand the private sector 
during the late nineties. These policies included measures to increase and improve the 
efficiency of private sector companies. The government believed that a strong private 
sector would develop alternative sources of revenue for the economy besides oil and gas 
and provide employment opportunities for its population besides helping to reduce the 
size of governmental bureaucracies.38 By offering training programs and interest-free 
loans the government began to encourage its female civil servants to become 
businesswomen. In fact, it was during this time that most of the members of the WBC 
started their businesses. 
By the year 2000, Malay-Muslim women owned a substantial proportion of all the 
businesses in Brunei. While exact demographic figures are unavailable for the period, one 
can gather the scale of this phenomenon with a few facts. According to official figures, 
by the late-nineties, the number of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in Brunei rose 
to almost 40,000 in total and these SMEs provided as much as 70 percent of employment 
in the private sector.39 More than half of these SMEs were owned or co-owned by Malay 
Muslim women and most of these women started with small companies in retailing, 
catering, handicrafts, tailoring, and so on.40 Given this significant economic contribution 
                                                 
38 Blomqvist, Hans. C. “The endogenous State of Brunei Darassalam: The traditional society versus 
economic development.” Proceedings at the University of Vaasa. Discussion Papers 226 1997. 
39Brunei Darussalam Statistical Yearbook 1999, Department of Statistics, Department of Economic 
Planning and Development (JPKE), Prime Minister’s Office, Brunei Darussalam.  
40 Wimalatissa, WA. “The Emerging Class of Businesswomen and Women-owned businesses in Brunei.” 
Journal of Enterprising Culture. 4 (1996): 287-300. 
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of Malay Muslim businesswomen to the national economy, the Brunei government 
decided to create a national women’s organization to address their business concerns.  
 Therefore, in November 2000, the Women’s Business Council was created under 
a special decree of the Government of His Majesty the Sultan and Yang Di-Pertuan of 
Brunei Darussalam.41 The Women Business Council (WBC) was set up in response to a 
pressing need to have a national body that served the interest of local Malay Muslim 
businesswomen and to establish networks amongst female business owners. The WBC 
was established with the aim of providing professional support to businesswomen and 
helping women gain knowledge and access to government financial resources specifically 
allocated to help female Malay Muslims start and develop SMEs. According to a paper 
published in 2005 by Datin Paduka Hajah Rokiah, the Vice President of the WBC, the 
WBC plays a major role in developing SMEs for women where "apart from training and 
mentoring, the WBC also provides access to wider opportunities, advice on common 
business issues, and unites common business interests,"42 The WBC has the mandate to 
forge a strategic network amongst women’s businesses in Brunei but it also has a larger 
ambition to create links with other global business organizations by sending its members 
to regular international conferences on management and leadership across the globe.  
Currently, the WBC represents a small portion of women who own businesses in 
Brunei. Yet the creation WBC symbolizes the government’s intentions to highlight this 
emerging group of entrepreneurial women as an important social group in Bruneian 
society. Given the unemployment problem and the finite supply of oil reserves, the WBC 
was implicitly expected to help achieve the state’s important goal of economic 
diversification. Although WBC members do not yet comprise all the businesswomen in 
Brunei, the organization is an effective vehicle which formally represents the 
businesswomen community in Brunei. It is important to reiterate that the WBC still 
remains the only national body which was set up to specifically address professional 
issues faced by businesswomen who are no longer dependent on the government to be 
their employers. However besides support, it could also be argued that the WBC was 
                                                 
41 Women’s Business Council. Our Aims and Objectives. Bandar Seri Begawan: Brunei (2000). 
42 Rokiah, Hazah. "Developing Opportunities for SMEs in Brunei Darussalam." Working Paper delivered at 
APEC 2002 meeting. Bandar Seri Begawan. Brunei: 2002.  
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created as a means for the Brunei government to regulate female-owned SMEs and the 
opinions of businesswomen in Brunei. 
Overall, the creation of the WBC signified the economic capacity of Malay 
Muslim women in Brunei and the organization play a meaningful and potent role to 
encourage and support business ventures amongst women when compared to often social 
and charity roles played by other national women’s organizations in the country. Not only 
is the WBC unique in its serious role, its development also represents a historic step of 
progress in the public role played by Malay-Muslim Bruneian women.  
Many of the previous women’s groups created by the government were aimed at 
prioritizing the significance of employed women or the wives of employed men only. With 
the formation of the WBC however, there was at least a symbolic assertion of the 
economic role of women in Brunei. The WBC in particular valorized the economically 
independent Malay Muslim businesswomen as a public role model. As we shall observe 
later, there are significant implications of such a development in terms of the relationship 
between these businesswomen and the state of Brunei. 
 
Contextualizing the WBC with other National Women’s Organizations  
 
To represent the new economic position of businesswomen, the WBC is the latest 
national women’s organization created by the government. However, women have been 
officially represented in thirteen other national women’s organizations. The first 
women’s organization created by the government was the Council of Women, established 
in 1984, which serves as the umbrella organization overseeing all other women’s 
organizations in the country, which includes the WBC. Although the WBC has been the 
most recent addition to this umbrella organization, it has already made itself distinct from 
this parent body and other women’s organizations. In fact, the WBC is currently the only 
organization which addresses economic challenges faced by business women in Brunei. 
This section evaluates the ways in which the WBC plays a different role from pre-
existing women’s organizations. Its divergence from other female organization transpires 
through its goals, the professional identity that it aspires to and represents, its activities 
and its leadership.  
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Although the WBC represents businesswomen in Brunei, it is not a social 
association but rather a professional body representing the economic interests of female 
entrepreneurs. This professional aspect of the organization leads to its most striking 
contrast with other women’s organizations in Brunei. The WBC brings together 
businesswomen based on their economic position and not their social identities even if all 
the members share a common background as middle-aged Malay Muslims women. 
Neither does WBC perform any social or charity role. Rather, the WBC has been created 
to help the government achieve its specific economic goals and expectations and this goal 
has been clearly stated in its objectives. According to its official mission statement, the 
goal of the WBC is “to unite and assist businesswomen on common interests and 
concerns and to provide training and development.”43 Such an articulation of the official 
goals indicates that the WBC has been created as a professional organization which helps 
realize the government’s larger economic objectives for the twenty-first century.  
This economic characteristic of the WBC lies in its stark contrast with other 
women’s organizations in Brunei. Many pre-existing national women’s bodies were 
created on the basis of the social status of the female members’ husbands. For instance, 
the various women’s associations for the wives of army officers (BAKTI), police officers 
(PERTIWI), foreign diplomats (IWC), prison guards (PELITA), and BISTARI (senior 
public sector employed men) illustrate the importance of the husband’s occupation as 
identity for these women’s organizations. Other examples of such women’s organizations 
are PERTIWI and BAKTI, organizations for the wives of police officers and army 
officers respectively, which are mandatorily for the wives of these government officers.  
Such mainstream women organizations serve the interests of wives of 
government-employed men because there are no national organizations for the men 
themselves. On a side note, male and female employees of the public sector, civil 
servants and security force personnel are legally forbidden from joining many non-
governmental organizations because they are civil servants.44 It is commonly understood 
that the official women’s organizations serve a role in facilitating social interactions 
amongst civil servants and to influence the prospects of promotion and pay-raise for their 
                                                 
43 Women’s Business Council. Our Aims and Objectives. Bandar Seri Begawan: Brunei (2000). 
44 Haji Momin, Zainal. “Negera Brunei Darussalam’’ Prevention and Settlement of labor disputes in 
ASEAN: Brunei.” Joint ILO-ASEAN Progamme of Industrial Relations for Development. 1985 :57-64. 
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husbands.45  However, given that the husbands of these women in the official women’s 
organizations benefit more directly than the female members themselves, it is arguable 
whether these organizations were created or not to cater to the needs of its female 
members. 
However, not all women’s organizations in Brunei are based on their husbands’ 
occupation. There are also women’s organizations such as the PGGMB (the Malay 
Teachers Association), the PSW (Graduate Students Association) and the WBC, which 
have other motives. These organizations represent the interests of working and educated 
women as by the late eighties, Malay Muslim women in Brunei have become a large 
group of civil servants working in the public sector as well as are university students   
The government of Brunei recognizes its female citizens’ ever-evolving roles 
within the Brunei’s economy and the establishment of women’s organizations serves as a 
formal acknowledgment of their significance as professionals since the country’s 
independence in 1984. These women’s organizations represent an important step towards 
the recognition of the economic importance of women as professionals and employees of 
the large public sector who are clearly dependent on the government for their financial 
position. Hence, although the women in these organizations perform an economic role, 
they are nevertheless not economically independent like the businesswomen in the WBC.  
The WBC is hence different from the two types of women’s organizations 
mentioned above. It is not an organization representing the interests of husbands in civil 
service or the interests of women in civil service. Rather it is an organization formed to 
highlight and assert the invaluable contribution women private entrepreneurs who 
contribute to the growing private sector and economy of Brunei. 
Furthermore, the difference between the WBC and other women’s organizations 
becomes even clearer when we observe the nature of the activities organized by the latter 
groups during the past few years.46 Unlike the WBC’s regular events, the yearbooks of 
the other women’s organizations are often about social and charitable activities. Most 
organizations have held cookery contests, hosted the Queen’s birthdays and baby 
                                                 
45 Begum, Ruksana (member of BAKTI). “Personal Interview.” 30 December 2007. 
46 Except for the GWA (Graduate Women’ Association) that had only activity all of last year. However that 
one was a birthday celebration of the Queen. This indicated that if they did participate or organize an 
activity it would most likely have been social in nature. 
 34
showers, awarded prizes to academic achievements of the members’ children, attended 
celebrations, and other such social events. Even the PGGMB (Organization for Women 
Teachers), which celebrates the knowledge contributions of Muslim Malay female 
government school teachers, did little else other than a few birthday celebrations for the 
King and Queen in the previous year. The activities of these women’s organizations are 
predominantly social and even though these organizations comprised working and 
educated women, they pay little attention to the economic or social challenge faced by 
female ‘professionals.’  
In contrast to these organizations, the WBC does not organize social events. In 
fact, its members hardly have time to organize regular meetings because they are so busy 
with their businesses. As Mariam Abdullah, a senior WBC member who rarely attended 
meetings commented, “we cannot waste our time partying like those groups.”47 Many 
WBC members echoed her opinion and claimed that they had no time to attend social 
functions. Often, they deemed social events organized by other women’ associations as a 
waste of time. Maznah Amar Hamdan, a caterer and another senior member of the WBC, 
disapproved of engaging in meetings “like those other groups go for the sake of it. If I 
want to meet my friends I go meet my friends. I do not need to have a ‘meeting.’48 This 
sentiment was reciprocated by Wiwiek Hamdan Ali, a relative newcomer to the 
organization who joined WBC in 2004, “I wanted to join because I have been to other 
organizations and this one does not waste time with parties. In fact, we don’t have 
meetings more than twice or thrice a year. It makes sense because we all have ‘work’ to 
do.”49  
The personal opinions and comments of WBC members themselves further 
reinforced the idea that the organization was created to address professional and work 
related issues that affect its members and not as a means for women to ‘socialize.’  They 
considered themselves a more ‘serious’ organization with genuine concerns for the 
interests of their members. As Wiwiek later added, “When we can help each other then 
we help genuinely. We do not gossip or play favorites. When we cannot help each other, 
we are honest and we do not waste time having meetings.” The members of the WBC 
                                                 
47 Abdullah, Mariam. Personal Interview.” 25 December 2007. 
48 Hamdan, Maznah. “Personal Conversation.” 2 January 2008. 
49 Ali,Wiwiek. “Personal Conversation.” 29 December 2007. ,  
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also indirectly acknowledge the difference between their organization’s goals and others 
by considering other organizations’ meetings to merely social gatherings. 
Another common activity amongst women’s organization in Brunei which the 
WBC does not partake in is charity. Many women’s associations in Brunei take up the 
causes of Malay Muslim orphans or single mothers within Brunei. They often extend 
their charitable undertakings to Muslims all across the globe and raise funds for natural 
disasters like the Tsunami in Aceh50 and earthquake in Pakistan.51 Nevertheless when I 
asked the WBC members if they undertook charitable events as an organization their 
responses revealed that they considered charity as social parties.  
In fact, many of them asserted that as Muslims, they were obliged and happy to 
offer money to charity and were satisfied performing this religious duty at the personal 
level. As Hizah Haji Ahmed, a restaurant owner and member of the WBC, casually 
explained, “We do not think our life is perfect. We have so many problems that we 
ourselves cannot solve. It would be silly for us to pretend like we can save the world’s 
problems”52 Mona Shaheed, a bookshop owner and member of the WBC since 2001 
added, “charity is a private thing, I do not want to put myself on display when I am doing 
good things. I think charity balls are for show and not only to do good for other people. 
Even if the WBC arranged one, I would never attend it”53 When I asked Mariam whether 
she wished for charitable events to be undertaken by WBC, her response was similar, 
“charity events are basically parties. We are devout Muslims, we do our fair share of 
zakat54 individually. There is no need for this dramatic performance. Islam honours 
modesty and humility not this.”55 It would be misleading to assert that the members of the 
                                                 
50 On 26 December 2004, a 9.1-magnitude underwater earthquake caused a tremendous tsunami that 
devastated Aceh Province, Indonesia, resulting in the deaths of some 128,715 people (as of 18 April 2005). 
This tragedy evoked great concern internationally. Governments, multilateral organizations, international, 
national and local NGOs, religious organizations, ethnic organizations, professional organizations, 
educational institutions and others have rushed to provide aid to the people of Aceh. 
51The 2005 Great Pakistan earthquake was a major earthquake centered in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.  
It registered a debatable 7.6 or 7.7 on the Richter scale and the official death toll was 79,000, while officials 
say nearly 1,400 people also died in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir and four people in 
Afghanistan.  
52 Ahmed, Hizah Haji. “Personal Interview.” 26 December 2007. 
53 Shaheed, Mona. “Personal Interview.” 29 December 2007. 




WBC are ‘inconsiderate’ because of their desire that their organization disengages from 
charitable functions as many, as indicated in their responses, do contribute to charity on 
their own.  
The discussion about charity emphasizes an important point: the members of the 
WBC do not consider the organization as one which should be contributing to charity 
causes. Rather the interviews substantiate that WBC members are keen that the 
organization takes seriously their economic interests as businesswomen in the first place. 
Many of the women interviewed talked about their sense of dissatisfaction with their 
economic situation as entrepreneurs. As the Treasurer of the WBC, Maznah confided to 
me, “The WBC is unique in that our priorities are not social in nature as we still have our 
own problems and our own economic priorities to take care of.”  Maznah added, “When 
we meet as an organization we discuss our own business situations and ways to deal with 
the problems that we are facing as businesswomen. If we ourselves do not, solve it then 
who will?”56 The theme was replicated when Mona, the bookshop owner, commented, 
“we are not poor but we have issues. I believe everyone should take of their own 
problems”57 Her candid explanations reiterate how seriously the WBC took its objectives 
to improve the businesses of its members.   
Given the economic and political context of Brunei, it takes a degree of honesty 
and courage to accept and express dissatisfaction. Most women’s organizations undertake 
charitable activities because they intend to project the privileged situation of Malay 
Muslims of Brunei. The WBC is one of the few organizations where Malay Muslim 
women have been able to seriously assert their ambition as businesswomen and their 
desire to see state support and improvement of their positions as economic players in the 
Brunei economy.   
Finally, the relevance of the WBC is revealed through the uniqueness and 
selection of its leadership. Although all the women’s organizations in Brunei elect their 
executive committee in their biannual general meetings, the results of these general 
elections are usually predictable. It is usually assumed that only ‘popular women’ win 




these elections. Since popularity is usually ascertained by their ability to throw lavish 
parties or to invite prestigious guests to organizational events, the structure undeniably 
privileges titled women members or exceptionally affluent men’s wives to be on the 
executive committee of these organizations. If one is to broadly survey the executive 
committees of most of the women’s bodies in Brunei, the President and Vice-President 
are often titled women. In the case of organizations created for the wives of police 
officers (PERTIWI) or army officers (BAKTI), these positions are often held by the 
wives of the most senior army or police officer. In fact, during the 2008 general elections 
of the principal women’s body, the Council of Women, arguments were put forward by 
members stating that the current system ensured that “the same people would most likely 
be voted in the ranking position.”58  
However, WBC leadership tends to be differently selected. Although titled 
women are found in the organization, there is little evidence that they necessarily hold the 
top executive positions. To explore the reasons for this peculiarity, I corresponded with 
the members of the WBC themselves. Maznah, the food caterer, was relieved that the 
WBC elections were “fair and genuine. Unlike the other organizations we actually elect 
the best members amongst us. It is not about who is popular. Such things are not criteria 
for leadership.” Wiwiek, a handicraft store owner, reinforced this opinion by adding “it is 
difficult for anyone to be popular or throw parties because we hardly meet.” In addition 
to Wiwiek’s perspective, Hizah added that the “leader should be someone who is the 
most successful person in our organization. We have titled leaders too, but look at our 
president, Major Sophia. Do you know how hard it is for a woman to become a Major? 
She has merit.” The responses of the members reiterated this significant difference 
between them and the other women’s groups. The leadership of the WBC seems to be 
based on personal merit when compared to other women’s groups. This indicates that 
WBC members award more credit to individual achievements of their leaders as opposed 
to using conventional and traditional determinants of social status as criteria for 
leadership role. 
                                                 
58 Masli, Ubaidullah, “10 Officers voted into the Women’ Council AGM.” The Brunei Times. 5 May 2008. 
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The creation of the WBC has implications for the relations between State and 
economic groups in Brunei. Until the creation of the WBC, the State-citizen relationship 
explicated by previous women’s organizations appeared more straightforward. The 
members of these other women’s organizations depended on the state for their identity as 
employees in government jobs or wives of government employees and their well-being as 
citizens in a welfare monarchy. The economic position of Malay Muslim women 
members in these other women’s organizations is determined by the State’s role as their 
employer. Such a relationship warrants a unidirectional interpretation of the interactions 
between the members of those organizations as women citizens and the State of Brunei. It 
is difficult to find educated workingwomen in these women’s organizations who can 
separate themselves as subjects of a welfare state and their own personal identity. But for 
WBC members, they are able to see themselves as contributors to the Brunei economy 
and hence not as mere subject of the Brunei government. Their economic ambition and 
independence provide them with a more nuanced conceptualization of their relationship 
with the government of Brunei and hence enable them to lobby for recognition and 
support of their economic ambition using their special status as female entrepreneurs who 




 In the above overview of the WBC and its comparison with other women’s bodies 
in Brunei, I have shown that in many ways the WBC is more serious about its priorities to 
improve its member’s economic positions. Given that Brunei is a dictatorial Monarchy, 
the actual effectiveness of the WBC to negotiate with the government is however 
severely limited. In reality, the WBC exists as only an additional women’s body in 
Brunei. However, within its eight years of existence, it has been able to create a unique 
niche for itself as a professional women’s organization that does not engage in social 
activities and charitable events but rather lobbies hard to improve the position and 
opportunities opened up for businesswomen. Hence, before prematurely dismissing its 
impact, one must appreciate that despite all the structural limitations surrounding the 
creation of the WBC, social transformations are slow processes that do not always start in 
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radical ways. Sometimes, the most revolutionary movements and changes are undertaken 
by the most conventional medium. While I cannot assert yet that the WBC has some 
grand reformist agenda under its sleeve, I can however confirm with some certainty that 
the WBC itself is a change in women’s role in Brunei society and economy.  
I would like to end this chapter by stressing that the development of a 
businesswomen’s organization like the WBC was not an accidental development. It was 
rather the culmination of many years of state-citizens negotiations on both personal and 
collective levels by the members of the WBC. In the following chapters, I will attempt to 
unearth instances of dialectic State-citizen negotiations amongst these businesswomen 
during three specific periods: their education and employment years (1970s-1980s); their 
job resignation and setting up of their business (late 1980s-1990s); and after business 






















The First Generation of Educated Workingwomen (1970s-80s) 
 
          In the previous chapter, we learnt that the government had created the Women’s 
Business Council to enable a public space primarily to address the work-related issues 
faced by middle-aged Malay Muslim businesswomen in Brunei. I concluded by 
advancing the argument that the emergence of the members of the WBC was the possible 
outcome of many previous decades of interactions with the government to improve their 
economic and social positions. However, before elaborating on these historical 
developments, it should be understood that my informants were well educated women 
who worked in the civil service sector before they became businesswomen. This chapter 
explores an important period of their life. 
Theoretically, one could attribute the high level of education amongst my 
informants to be the result of particular state-initiated policies to encourage education 
amongst Malay Muslims boys and girls during the seventies.59 The logic then follows that 
since the members of the WBC were in school during the seventies, they were able to 
attain good government jobs when the government began encouraging women to work in 
the eighties. Because of their experience and previous educational qualifications, they 
were then able to rapidly reach senior positions at their jobs. Hence when the government 
encouraged senior employees to resign and start their own businesses, these women were 
again in a privileged position to avail to these entrepreneurial opportunities, which 
amongst other things explained why they became the members of the WBC. Yet such 
government-centered explanation for these women’s career developments is contentious 
because it does not take into account the social-cultural transformations and attitude 
towards women working and being economically independent within Brunei across 
seventies to the nineties  
In this chapter, I insist that although public policies were a significant contributor 
to the economic position of the current members of the WBC, these policies could not be 
                                                 
59 Abu Hanifah bin Mohd. Salleh. “Curriculum Innovation in Brunei since 1970.” M.Ed Thesis, Hull: 
University of Hull, 1979. 
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effective without a parallel change in societal values and perceptions about women, 
education, work and family during various stages of their lives. I argue that during the 
seventies, the governmental policies and social changes amongst Malay Muslim 
communities were both integral to explain the immense progress in education and 
employment that women experienced during this period. For instance, in all the personal 
accounts of these businesswomen, I found that they all represented the first generation of 
educated-women in their own families. As recently as the generation before them, that is 
of their mothers’ who were born in the thirties and forties, there was still a social stigma 
associated with Malay Muslim girls who were educated. Therefore I suggest that certain 
social transformations with respect to attitudes towards women’s education and 
employment have had to occur within the Malay Muslim communities in Brunei which 
made it possible for women from the generation of WBC members to attain higher 
education during the seventies.   
A more contextual interpretation of this development would recall that during the 
seventies, Brunei was still a profoundly patriarchal community with rigid restrictions on 
women and their social mobility. These WBC businesswomen were raised under a 
relatively conservative societal milieu. Stigmas against women who ventured into the 
public spaces like institutions of higher learning or workplaces were only beginning to 
dissipate in the seventies and eighties. After all, public policies favorable for women 
would not in themselves be effective in achieving the desired results without a parallel 
evolution in social values and perceptions about women, education, and work within 
Bruneian society. 
                  This chapter details two aspects of governmental policies toward education 
and societal changes. The first, explores the relationship between the economic 
circumstances prevailing in Brunei and public policies targeted at the education of Malay 
Muslim women in the seventies. It then provides a brief overview of the social scene in 
Brunei during the fifties and sixties to emphasize the difference in lifestyles between 
members of the WBC, who were in their adolescence, from their mothers during this 
time. The differences from their mothers’ life which they experienced and the social 
circumstances encountered effectively shaped my informants towards desiring a career in 
the public sector by the eighties. Their experiences in the seventies and eighties were 
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merely representative of a unique generation of Malay Muslim women, many of whom 
were to move onto become businesswomen.  
 The second aspect elaborates on the ability of my respondents to make 
corresponding family choices that optimized their capacity to take advantage of 
government policies in favor of their employment during the late eighties. They 
navigated adroitly through their gender duties associated with ‘traditional’ lifestyles of 
Bruneian society in extraordinary ways by manipulating social norms like the early age 
for marriage and large extended families to allow themselves more autonomy and time in 
order to carve out a civil service career for themselves.  Here, the point that evolving 
social attitudes towards women and work facilitated public policies which encouraged 
women to work is emphasized and its dramatic results discussed. It was indeed the 
women’s capacity to adapt to, as well as manipulate, traditional familial obligations that 
they were able to bring together their family, education and career choices as they rode 
on government policies which allowed them to improve their economic positions as 
workingwomen.  
 My discussions will highlight several factors including the evolution of Malay 
Muslims societal values and the creativity of the WBC members themselves in navigating 
traditional familial expectations as crucial factors for the emergence of the first 
generation of workingwomen in Brunei.  Such a background to the emergence of working 
women in Brunei reinstates the main theme of this thesis that the members of the WBC 
have had to be innovative and resourceful in various stages of their life in order to 
become an independent social group as entrepreneurs in Brunei.  
A few issues may limit the scope of this argument. Since little ethnographic 
information is available on the perceptions and experiences of the Malay Muslim women 
during the fifties and eighties, I will synthesize personal views and memories of the WBC 
businesswomen whom I interviewed in order to substantiate the developments of social 
perceptions and changed values towards women and work during this era. I will also refer 
to archival articles in international newspapers and memoirs written by other Malay-
Muslim businesswomen in order to present a picture of the social mores about women, 
education, and work between the fifties and the nineties in Brunei in order to help paint 
this larger picture of Brunei society at these times. The logical inferences drawn from 
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these additional sources will be used to help my analysis of the experiences of these 
businesswomen.  
 
Brunei’s Economy and Women’s Education  
 
In the past forty years, Malay Muslim women in Brunei witnessed more progress 
in terms of education and employment than any generation of Bruneian women before 
them. The transition from almost zero female literacy in the middle of the past century to 
a literacy rate for women of over 92 percent by the late nineties represents indeed a 
dramatic transformation in literacy rates over the years.60 This section examines the 
evolution of Brunei’s economy until the seventies and its effect on the specific education 
policies that led to a significant rise in the enrollment of girls in government schools in 
Brunei.  
The social attitudes towards women’s education were very limiting until the late 
sixties. In fact, the first government school was opened in Brunei in 1915, and only boys 
could attend. According to a British government report of 1933, it was noted that “apart 
from government servants, few Malays liked the idea of their girls attending schools. It 
was [...] that purdah61 has a much stronger hold in Brunei than in the Federated Malay 
States."62 Brunei was a traditional patriarchal society that did not favor women’s forays 
in to public spaces like formal schools. In 1954, Brunei government nevertheless 
embarked on its first Five Year Development Plan for education. However, this initiative 
met with limited success in promoting women’s education.  For example, by 1959, there 
were only 3000 girls enrolled in the State's schools at the Primary level.63 
Complementary evidence shows that the economic situation in the fifties was appalling, 
as a result, there was little money left for social policies.64  
                                                 
60 Tisdell, Clem. “Brunei’s quest for sustainable development: diversification and other strategies” 
Readings on the Economy of Brunei Darussalam,  Brunei, Universiti Brunei Darussalam: 1999.  p 20 l-225. 
61 Purdah refers concretely to a type of Middle Eastern veils that covered the whole body, and more 
abstractly this terms refers to the Islamic customs that require women to carry themselves with modesty.  
62 Yunos, Rozan. “Brunei Education System, One of the Best.” The Brunei Times. October 21 2007. 
63 Abu Bakar Haji Apong. “The Development of Education during Self Government Period, with special 
reference to Primary Education.” Diss. Lancaster: University of Lancaster, 1980.  
64 This period was marked by the Brunei government attempting to recuperate and rebuild its oil fields that 
were destroyed during World War Two. 
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 The period between the fifties and seventies coincided with some difficult 
economic realities in Brunei. In the Second World War, the oil industry had been 
completely destroyed by the Japanese invasion. In addition, the country was running on a 
deficit budget and was still recuperating from the damage of the Japanese invasion of 
Brunei. After the Second World War, the reconstruction of schools was severely delayed. 
As late as the end of the fifties, in Brunei Town,65 some recently discovered student 
memoirs described their school as having no paper and no furniture. Moreover, some 
memoirs emphasized the appalling facilities for education:  
 
 Every time they had to write something, they will be using a slab which would 
be wiped clean every time they have covered the slab. The students would be on 
the floor lying prone facing downwards writing on their slabs. Their pencils 
would be an inch stub scavenged from the Australian army camp. To make the 
pencils longer, the students used empty bullet casing fitted in at the end of the 
pencils.66  
 
 Some personal memoirs of the time even claimed that some Bruneians “were seen 
wearing bark from trees as their clothes.”67 Many Bruneians suffered from malnutrition 
and endemic diseases, because of the lack little financial resources or medical facilities in 
Brunei available for them. After the war, there were a number of shortages in food and 
medicines which took many years to eradicate. The economic situation in Brunei thus 
remained difficult for much of the fifties through to the beginning of the seventies. 
In the seventies, the economic situation within Brunei had remarkably improved. 
With the sharp increase in oil world prices in seventies, the Brunei government was able 
to invest its increasing revenues from petroleum exports into with education, social 
welfare and infrastructural development. Only in 1970, following a Brunei Youth 
Council seminar on education was the Education Commission established.68 The 
establishment of this Council played the most crucial role in the advancement of Malay 
Muslim women’s education in Brunei.69 The 1972 Commission Report was adopted by 
the government and formed the basis for the present education policy as well as the basic 
                                                 
65 The colonial name for Bandar Seri Begawan. 
66 Yunos, Rozan. “Brunei under the Japanese Invasion.” The Brunei Times, 29 June 2008 
67 Ibid. 
68 Education in Brunei Darussalam: An Outline. Bandar Seri Begawan: Ministry of Education, 1985. 
69 Abu Hanifah bin Mohd., Salleh. “Curriculum Innovation in Brunei since 1970.” Diss. University of Hull, 
1979.  
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organization of the present Ministry of Education.70 During those crucial years of the 
early seventies, the present education policy and the basic organization of the present 
Ministry of Education were founded.71  
Hence the period following these reforms in education corresponded with 
assertive and dynamic socio-economic development by the Brunei Government. The 
sudden increase in capital was invested in the improvement of Bruneians’ lifestyles and 
skills. Those policies invariably led to a sharp increase in the number of Malay Muslim 
children who attended primary and secondary schools. For instance, while almost 4000 
students were enrolled in primary schools in 1953, there was a dramatic 750 percent 
increase in those numbers by the seventies, only 20 years later. Similarly, the initial 
enrollment of 324 adolescents in secondary schools in 1953 multiplied almost forty times 
to around 12,500 by 1973.72 Significantly, this advancement in education coincided with 
the schooling of the members of the WBC. 
The above examination of the economic situation in Brunei between the fifties 
and seventies revealed the extent to which the educational policy of the government 
depended on the economic performance of the country. It was a daunting task for the 
government to persuade a majority of Malay Muslims parents to send their daughters to 
school. The low standard of living and poverty amongst most Malay Muslim Bruneians 
made the choice of sending their children to school a difficult compromise. When they 
were able to send a few of their children, the daughters were usually given the least 
priority. Moreover, the government was also unable to financially sustain an effort to 
encourage education amongst its people. Only during the unprecedented boom in world 
oil prices of the seventies was Brunei able to invest a fair share of its economic windfall 
on education and its infrastructure development.73 
However, within the context of Brunei, even with the economic progress, mere 
public policies and financial resources to open high quality schools for girls would not 
have guaranteed that girls would actually enroll in those schools. These polices had to be 
                                                 
70 Yunos, Rozan. “Brunei Education System, one of the Best.” The Brunei Times. October 21 2007 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ali Ameer, “From Penury to Plenty: The Development of Oil Rich Brunei, 1906 to Present.” Department 
of Research Monograph Series 2. Perth: Murdoch University, 1996. 
73 Majid, Harun Abdul. Rebellion in Brunei: The 1962 Revolt, Imperialism, Confrontation and Oil. New 
York: IBTaurus. 2007. 
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complemented by favorable social attitudes. For instance, the development of a parallel 
desire on behalf of those girls’ parents to allow them to pursue a formal education was 
very important to ensure that most Malay Muslim girls were sent to school. Otherwise, 
regardless of the significant financial allocations for the development of women’s 
education during the seventies, significantly fewer girls would have been enrolled in 
schools in the seventies without a positive reception from Bruneian society.               
While the progression of Malay Muslims within Brunei society arguably 
coincided with the rising standard of living amongst them, such an assertion would risk 
ignoring the social policies financed by the government to encourage parents to send their 
daughters to school. Therefore, while the link between economic fortunes of Brunei and 
the government’s will to allocate resources to social development policies is clear, we 
have yet to understand how these policies were received by the Malay Muslims during 
the period. In the next section, I examine the social changes in parents’ attitudes towards 
women’s education which indirectly hints at the societal evolution of changed gender 
perceptions and on women, education, and work by the seventies. 
 
Changing Social Attitudes (Fifties to Nineties) 
 
Most of the members of the Women Business Council completed their secondary 
schooling in the late seventies. The stories of these businesswomen are representative of a 
generation of women who were among the first to be formally educated at a tertiary level 
in Brunei. Many of the educated businesswomen who formed the WBC today took 
advantage of the government’s unequivocal support of education. They were fortunate to 
have been born during better times for women and they optimally utilized this 
opportunity to fulfill more ambitious dreams.  
           The seventies were marked by dynamic shifts in societal attitudes towards many 
sexually egalitarian practices in education and employment. For example, Malay Muslim 
parents wanted to send both their sons and daughters to be formally educated, while 
earlier they would have only supported their sons for an education. During this time, the 
government was also in a position to spend substantial sums of money on mass 
campaigns to help change the Malay Muslim community’s inability in educating their 
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children. Many of my respondents belonged to the generation of girls who were sent to 
school along with their brothers in the seventies. In contrast to the negligible number of 
girls who went to school in the fifties, members of the WBC were amongst the first 
generation of educated girls in their own families.  
 The members of the WBC elaborated on their grandmother’s rationalization for 
their mothers’ historical exclusion from educational opportunities in Brunei. Much of the 
rationale for not permitting women to study in those days was based on concerns over the 
usefulness of education. As one of my informants articulated, “My grandpa asked, what 
is the use of going to school at a time girls were not able to work after that? I knew your 
mother had to get married and needed to learn what was needed to be a good wife and 
mother. It is more useful.”74 Malay Muslim women were traditionally socialized to 
become homemakers, and many parents during the fifties frowned upon formal education 
for their daughters. After all, they would be primarily expected to cook, clean, have 
children and take care of the house.  
However, the generation of the WBC members did not face the same 
expectations. Coincidentally, during the seventies the government introduced measures to 
provide many opportunities in the workplaces for educated Malay Muslim women. The 
rationalization of their grandparents found during their mothers’ generation ceased to be 
of relevance. The promise and possibility of work in the seventies inversely changed the 
attitudes of Malay Muslims parents to send their daughters to school even though many 
of them were not educated themselves. To my knowledge no anthropological or 
sociological study on the processes of changing social values in Brunei had been done on 
this subject. However changing social mores increased the ease with which the members 
of the WBC could venture into careers during the seventies.75 While the Bruneian 
government was unquestionably supportive of women’s achievements in public 
employment, Brunei society as a whole was still in the transition between the traditional 
ways of living and the current times.  
 Despite being uneducated themselves, their mothers had faith in education. As a 
result, they encouraged their daughters to attend school.  It is important to appreciate the 
                                                 
74 Abdullah, Mariam. “Personal Interview.” 10 January 2008. 
75 Neville, Warwick. “Economy and Employment in Brunei” Geographical Review 75 (1985): 451-461 
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role played by their ‘uneducated’ mothers, who adapted to the changing times and 
believed that education was an indispensable asset for their daughters. Many of the 
businesswomen were grateful that their parents allowed them to go to school. The 
changing social values of the parents were as crucial to these young women’s ability to 
attain an education as with the availability of free schooling provided by the government. 
However, we can safely infer that the members of the WBC were fortunate to be born in 
an era when their education was valued by their parents and facilitated by the 
government. 
   
Employment and Families in the Eighties 
 
 Many of the businesswomen confirmed that women in previous generations who 
had acquired an education (in exceptional cases) were not encouraged to work outside the 
house. Based on varying religious and cultural premises, women’s participation in the 
public sphere dominated by men was frowned upon. This public sphere included 
institutions of higher education and places of work. However one vital factor has yet to 
be elucidated: the impact on family life on these women’s choices. In this section I 
explore the ways in which the businesswomen approach traditional familial expectations 
in novel and inventive ways. For instance, instead of resigning themselves to a life of 
domesticity, they often negotiated with the matriarchs of their families into which they 
married to take care of their children and opted for fewer children than their parents in 
order to be able to work. In the following segment, I expand on the ways these women 
did not consider tradition as some unchanging system of values but as opportunities that 
could be negotiated in order to attain their personal ambitions. 
  In most societies, marriage is an important factor that affects the ability of 
women to commit to a working career. Historically, in Brunei, the concern over marriage 
and raising many children drastically limited the visibility of women in the public spaces 
of Brunei. Such familial expectations from women left little time for them other than 
spending most of their married years rearing children. This information corresponded 
with observations from my interviews that most of the businesswomen’s mothers were 
married around sixteen and generally had about twelve children. In fact, most of the 
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businesswomen had over ten siblings in their families. However, such large families were 
rarely found in the case of my informants own families although they do observe the 
traditional practice of living in extended families where grandparents help to take care of 
their children - responsibilities which Malay Muslim women are expected to fulfill. In the 
eighties, Bruneian society was yet to become familiar with the culture of domestic maids 
and nuclear families.  
 As workingwomen during the eighties, many of the current members of the WBC 
innovatively negotiated between the aspects of traditional extended families and familial 
obligations found in Brunei society in order to allow themselves more autonomy in 
seeking employment. Many of these Malay Muslim women negotiated familial 
expectations along with their career ambitions in innovative ways. They did not view 
tradition as being permanently unchangeable and as obstacles but instead they used them 
as tools which they could manipulate in their favor. For instance, many of my informants 
belonged to a generation of Malay Muslim women who lived in extended families76 after 
marriage. Such joint-families were the common practice amongst Malay Muslims in 
Brunei during the seventies and living with the in-laws could complicate the process of 
pursuing education and finding work for women.  
 Many of the businesswomen interviewed confessed that they were initially scared 
to tell their husband and families about their interest in working. As most of them lived in 
joint families, the matter was sensitive. If they had succeeded so far to pursue an 
education under the auspices of their parents, they feared after marriage that in-laws 
would think that they were neglecting their family duties. Fortunately, their fears were 
not substantiated in reality. Most of their in-laws and husbands were in fact supportive of 
their decisions. Some of them even took care of their children to allow these women to 
work. For this precise reason, perhaps counter-intuitively, these businesswomen actually 
found it convenient to live in a joint family with their husband, his brothers and his 
parents because they were assured that someone was often able to take care of their 
children in their absence. Such a mutual understanding with senior members of the family 
would not have been possible for Malay Muslims women from the earlier generations. 
                                                 
76A joint family is a traditional form of communal living in Brunei where multiple generations of a family 
live under one roof. For example, grandparents would live with all their children and grandchildren in the 
same house.  
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Many of the businesswomen narrated stories of hierarchical and highly formal familial 
structures experienced by their own mothers and mothers-in-law. 
Some other small social changes were observed also in the form of this generation 
of women having far less number of children than their mothers. Although many of the 
businesswomen still married relatively early (before twenty-one), they had considerably 
fewer children. Most of the members of the WBC had an average of four to six children 
themselves. Given the context of Bruneian society in the eighties, it represented nearly 
half of the size of the families they hailed from. National birth statistics confirmed the 
reducing fertility rates across decades in Brunei. While the fertility rate in the fifties was 
over 7 children per woman, by the end of the seventies it had declined to approximately 4 
per woman.77    
During the eighties, after the education revolution, the government of Brunei 
unequivocally promoted the advancement of Malay Muslim women’s employment in 
certain professions. Given the government’s intent in reducing the number of migrant 
laborers in the public sectors of Brunei, Malay Muslim women were encouraged and 
supported by the state in order to fill these job vacancies. With such strides in Malay 
Muslim women’s access to public employment, 31 percent of the Malay Muslim women 
were economically employed for at least 15 hours of work a week by 1981.78 
Coincidentally, many of the businesswomen started their professional careers as teachers 
for government schools, clerks in senior positions in different Ministries or other similar 
service-oriented jobs. 
 However, the nature of the positions promoted by government were primarily 
skill-based, thus they generally required a minimum standard of formal and vocational 
training. The demographics of the unemployed population in Brunei revealed that the 
policy to promote women’s employment indirectly gave an explicit advantage to formally 
educated women. This preference for educated employees implied that the young 
educated members of the WBC during this time were qualified and able to take on 
government jobs almost automatically. My interviews confirmed that the majority of my 
informants had passed at least high school education while more than half of them had 
                                                 
77Azim, Parvez. “The Aging Population of Brunei Darussalam: Trends and Economic Consequences.” 
Asia-Pacific Population Journal. 17 (2002): 39-54. 
78Ministry of Labor, Annual Report on Brunei Darussalam. Bandar Seri Begawan: 1981. 
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obtained Diplomas.79Had these women not been uneducated, the government’s efforts to 
facilitate women’s employment would have had little effect on this specific group of 
women.  
   
Concluding remarks 
 
 In conclusion, these businesswomen’s stories revealed that they had witnessed 
rapid changes in their own lifetime. While they were born and raised during conservative 
times, their lives have evolved rapidly since the seventies. In many ways, these women 
evolved in a transitional generation of Malay Muslim women in Brunei. They were also 
fortunate to have reached the right age for schooling when the government encouraged 
girls’ education. Since they were educated when the government encouraged women’s 
education, they could then join the work force when the government encouraged 
women’s skilled employment.  
It remains fascinating how these businesswomen straddled between the traditional 
and the modern eras of Brunei with such flair. They were innovative in their 
accommodation of traditional societal expectations while simultaneously reaching new 
height in their career. They converted social and familial structures that were otherwise 
hindering women’ forays into the public sphere into effective support systems for 
themselves. For example, while these women were expected to marry young, they 
pursued their careers after fulfilling familial responsibilities. Despite the fact that they 
belonged to a traditional joint family, they were able to convince the older women of 
their families to take care of her children as they worked part-time. Such everyday 
negotiations by many of the members of the WBC and other similar aged workingwomen 
represent a common experience amongst the current generation of businesswomen who 
would soon become a unique socio-economic class in Brunei as they eventually switched 
from civil servants to become entrepreneurs/employers themselves. These women were 
the first generation of self-made, educated and ambitious Malay Muslim women in 
Brunei.  
                                                 
79 A one or two year professional degree that one completes after high school in fields like Teaching, 
Catering, Accounting, or Tailoring . 
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Until now, we have studied that the creation of such a mobile, independent, 
creative and skilled class of Malay Muslims women from the combined effects of an 
efficient public policy as well as personal motivations and social-moral changes about 
women, education and work during the seventies. So far, this phenomenon is 
generalizable to most educated working Malay Muslim women in the seventies and 
eighties. We have yet to unravel why only few educated working Malay Muslim women 
decided to become businesswomen by the end of the nineties. In the following chapter, I 
will address the social and governmental factors that enabled these women to make the 




















Government Policy and Workingwomen in the Nineties 
 
The growing significance of SMEs for Brunei’s future economic prosperity has 
been previously addressed in Chapter Three. I must briefly recapitulate that in order to 
address a potential unemployment crisis the government had to create enough jobs for its 
educated Malay Muslim citizens during the nineties. To enable the creation of more jobs, 
an alternative strategy was undertaken: the diversification of the economy through the 
creation of a dynamic entrepreneurial class in order to increase and improve the 
efficiency of private sector companies.80 This measure was hoped to not only fortify the 
productivity of the private sector, but also to simultaneously develop alternative sources 
of revenue for the economy besides oil and gas, provide employments opportunities for 
its population and help reduce the size of governmental bureaucracies by encouraging 
senior employees to retire.81 Interestingly, most members of the WBC started their 
businesses during this period. From this observation, this chapter intends to answer: how 
did a unique class of educated middle-aged Malay Muslim businesswomen emerge at the 
turn of the twenty-first century? I adopt a two-pronged investigation into the 
employment-related circumstances of the nineties. I look into the personal motivations of 
the members of the WBC given with the general work environment and their economic 
status in order to hypothesize how they were able to become entrepreneurs. 
To begin with, the employment situation in the nineties became a difficult issue. 
The imminent threat of an unemployment crisis was the main rationale behind many of 
the government policies that encouraged women to become entrepreneurs. However, the 
unemployment issue at the time was slightly more complicated than this simple logic 
suggests.  In the first section, I attempt to expose how the unemployment situation in the 
nineties was much worse for young educated Malay Muslims women than men. 
Unfortunately, the government could not compel these fresh graduates to start businesses 
                                                 
80 Ignatius Steven, “Brunei Will Reduce Dependence on Oil Gas,” Straits Times,  16 July 1996. 
81Mark Cleary, and Shuang Yann Wong, Oil, Economic Development and Diversification in Brunei 
Darussalam, Macmillan, London, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1994. 
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because they all dreamed of working for the government. However, adding to the 
problem of unemployment, the government work force was largely sex-segregated. It 
implied that women applicants could be considered for only a selection of the 
government jobs that were allocated to their gender, regardless of the proportion of 
women who applied. It was difficult to recruit women for ‘men’s’ jobs. As a result, such 
a structure compelled the government to encourage the senior women employees in 
particular to resign and start businesses.  
Encouraging the establishment of SMEs was the quickest and most effective way 
to generate new vacancies for the young Malay Muslim women without unsettling the 
gender order in the government sector and providing alternative income sources to retired 
employees. The grander economic framework distinctly motivated the government to 
encourage senior government women officials to resign from their positions and start 
their own businesses. In this chapter, I will first substantiate my argument with relevant 
statistics and empirical evidence from the nineties that highlight this peculiar 
unemployment situation. Yet, I do not wish to assert that the members of the WBC were 
forced to start businesses because of a mere change in government policies.  
In the second section, I elaborate on the ways in which factors like poor 
alternative career options and the inability to be promoted played a simultaneous role in 
shaping these women’s desire to become entrepreneurs. I refer to several examples of 
perceptions and opinions that I gathered from amongst my personal interviews with 
fifteen members of the WBC in order to corroborate my assertions. Once again, although 
low job satisfaction and the inability to be promoted were found to have encouraged the 
members of the WBC to become businesswomen, this explanation was still incomplete. 
Such problems were faced by all Malay Muslim who worked for the government sector 
in the nineties yet only a certain portion of Malay Muslim women chose to change their 
career. Consequently, the mentioned macroeconomic reasons for the development of 
business among women may not adequately clarify why the members of the WBC started 
their own businesses while not all Malay Muslim women who were working for the 
government took this avenue. 
I address the larger factors which motivated their business careers in the third 
section. Here, I link the personal aspirations of these women to become entrepreneurs 
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with their privileged economic position when compared to other working women as 
another possible explanation as to why they became entrepreneurs unlike the majority of 
working women in Brunei. 
Finally, I show how excessive unemployment amongst Malay Muslim women 
and sex-segregation of jobs during the nineties compelled the government to encourage 
many senior women employees to resign. The government in turn compensated those 
employees with a substantial sum of money which provided them with an alternative 
income source which enabled them to set up businesses. Hence when we integrate pre-
existing employment situation with personal aspirations and economic capacities of the 
WBC members, we arrive at a more complete interpretation of how such a unique class 
of educated middle-aged Malay Muslim businesswomen emerged at the turn of the 
twenty first century in Brunei.  
 
Malay Muslim Women and Unemployment 
 
By 1990, over 5,200 Malay Muslims were unemployed, twice as many as the 
beginning of the decade, and young Malay Muslim women made up almost 40 percent of 
that unemployment statistic.82 Between 1990 and 2000, the majority of individuals 
registered at the Employment Exchange Center were females.83 With time, the problem 
of women’s unemployment only further aggravated. According to published data by the 
United Nation Statistics Division, the unemployment rate for women in Brunei in 1990 
was at a staggering 24.7 percent, while the unemployment rate for men was only 2.4.84 
There was little doubt that other measures had to be taken in order to prevent widespread 
public dissatisfaction with the economic system and prevent political instability in 
Brunei.85 
However, awarding public sector jobs to Malay Muslims in Brunei was not a 
straightforward process. So far, the only way the government created more jobs was by 
                                                 
82 Thambipillai, Pushpa. Public Policy and Private Sector Employment: Brunei’s Foreign Labor. Brunei: 
UBD Press, 1992. 
83 http://www.apec.org/apec/documents_reports/ministerial_meeting_on_women/2002. 
84 United National Development Program: Statistics Table Code 4680. 
85 Doshi, Tilak. “Brunei the Steady State.” SEAA 1991: 71-80. (72). 
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increasing the size of its public sector.86 This strategy was limited in the long term as the 
bureaucracy had already become too large and inefficient.87 Women were assumed to 
dominate certain areas while men were assumed to occupy certain other sectors. 
Statistically, male participation in certain occupational categories such as legislators, 
administrators, managers and professionals, tended to be higher than female workers.88 
This situation could be explained by the existence of an institutional “glass ceiling” 
particularly in the public sector, and this ceiling implies that vacancies in these positions 
would preferably be replaced with men whenever they became vacant.89 Women tended 
to dominate in certain occupational categories like clerks, teachers, nurses and those in 
the service sector. These categories were then referred to as the “pink collar” jobs which 
were deemed to be more suitable for women.90 Such an unofficial yet implicit sex 
segregation of the workplace became a significant obstacle for young and educated 
Malay Muslim women in Brunei in their employment as there were fewer job vacancies 
opened to them with this sex-segregation. 
Due to this division of labour based on gender, educated Malay Muslim women 
graduates could only consider a limited number of positions. Even though Malay Muslim 
women graduates consistently outnumbered Malay Muslim male graduates, they would 
qualify only for a limited number of jobs. This division of labor in the public sector 
further aggravated the unemployment situation for women during the 1990s.91  
However, allowing women to occupy pre-determined male job positions was not 
an option as there were unemployed men as well during this period. Hence the 
government found it imperative to create more women-friendly vacancies for younger 
Malay Muslim women. The easiest and most convenient way to create jobs for the 
younger women and provide alternative sources of income for senior government 
                                                 
86 Talib, Naimah. “A Resilient Monarchy: The Sultanate of Brunei in a n era of Democratic States.” New 
Zealand Journal of Asian Studies. 4.2 (2002): 134-147. p.8 
87 Singh, Ranjit, and Sidhu,Jatswan. Historical Dictionary of Brunei Darussalam. London: Scarecrow Press, 
1997. 
88 Wimalatissa, WA. “The Emerging Class of Businesswomen and Women-owned businesses in Brunei.” 
Journal of Enterprising Culture. 4 (1996): 287-300. 
89 The Advancement of Women in ASEAN, A regional Report, 1996.  ASEAN Secretariat. 
90 Brunei Darussalam Statistical Year Book, 2000/2001 p.49. 
91 Othman, Malai Hassan, “Jobless queues grow in Sultanate.” The Borneo Bulletin. 10 March 1990. 
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employees was to encourage women in senior and mid-level positions in government jobs 
to retire and start businesses.  
Not surprisingly, this policy had a reverberating impact on the career options of 
the members of the WBC, many of whom were working in relatively high-ranking 
positions in various governmental agencies at the time. Many of the members of the 
WBC had chosen to resign in order to start their small businesses. When we combine this 
macro-economic situation with the government’s general plan to diversify its economy, 
the sudden emergence of a significant number of the middle-aged businesswomen in the 
late nineties becomes logical.  
  
Senior Government Employees and Working Life in Brunei 
 
 In the previous section, we observe how the unemployment situation with young 
educated Malay Muslim women motivated the government to specifically target senior 
female government-employees to start businesses. In the following section, I will 
elaborate on the reasons why the motives for starting a business appeared as an attractive 
alternative career prospect in lieu of the disillusioning work environment for many of my 
respondents. These women had already begun disliking their working life by the late 
nineties. In this segment, we will see that even before the above-mentioned government 
policies which motivated women to resign their jobs, these WBC members already 
harbored desires to retire from their civil service jobs due to frustrating work 
environment.  
Many of WBC members started their careers in the public sector in the eighties on 
junior positions such as teachers, clerks, administrative assistants and other related jobs. 
Because they were ambitious, within a decade of their employment many of them had 
reached relatively senior positions such as public relations manager or personal secretary 
to the Ambassador. By the mid-nineties, they began to realize that their prospects of 
further promotions were very limited. To illustrate their experience, I narrate experiences 
of several members of the WBC.   
Mariam Abdullah, a tailoring boutique owner, pursued a Diploma in 
Communications and English and became a middle school teacher in the early eighties. 
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After seven years in that position, she was recruited by the Ministry of Education as an 
Assistant Manager. But after almost eight years in that position, she felt that her situation 
was stagnant. She attempted to apply for other higher positions in other departments but 
to no avail. Mariam, insisted that she was initially quite contented with her senior clerical 
position for the Ministry of Education. After being in that position for over eight years, 
she reflected: “I did not feel challenged and I could not get promoted.” Despite having 
“proved herself in her job time and again for six whole long years, [she] was not 
considered for a transfer or promotion.” She continued, “Actually no one around me was 
getting promoted either except for this one man but even he was rare.” Mariam’s story 
revealed that she undeniably felt that her career had become immobile. Worse yet, her 
whole work atmosphere appeared stagnant as few people she knew were progressing in 
their career either. 
Mariam was not alone. Fatima Khidmatullah, another WBC member who owned 
a small florist in Kuala Belait, shared a similar experience. Fatima held a Diploma in 
Accounting but began her career as an assistant nurse at a government hospital in the mid 
eighties for two short years. Eventually she was hired as the Public Release Assistant at 
the Ministry of Public Affairs and her job description included writing memos to 
companies and other non-governmental institutions and updating them on national 
educational guidelines. As was the case with Mariam, Fatima felt disillusioned after 
almost a decade into her job: “I was doing the same thing everyday. Even if I wanted to 
make one small correction or suggestion to my manager, he would not listen. I felt like a 
robot with no challenge ahead of me.” The desire to have a challenging job was inherent 
in all the businesswomen’s narrations about job satisfaction.  
Even Raina Haji Mohammad, a retired government school teacher who managed 
a medium sized catering operation in Kulau Belait commented, “I liked working because 
it gave me a chance to prove myself and earn rewards. After a point many of the jobs in 
the government are basically obeying rules and nothing more. I do not mind rules, but I 
like interactive and dynamic work. This is hard to find in public sector job in Brunei.”92 
While Raina certainly found her career dormant, she also felt unchallenged and 
                                                 
92 Ahmed, Raina, Unpublished Personal  Interview. 24 December 2007. 
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unmotivated. Her job was mundane and monotonous; her story reinforced the impression 
that most bureaucratic jobs in Brunei were boring.  
The experiences of these businesswomen indicated that there was something 
intrinsically sluggish about working for the various government agencies. One wonders if 
sexual discrimination had a role to play in the ability of the members of the WBC to be 
promoted. While the public sector had gender-neutral wages, it is hard to ignore that 
Brunei still was inherently patriarchal in nature which might have affected these women’s 
ability to reach the highest echelons of the governmental bureaucracies. This suspicion is 
reaffirmed by statistical information from this time period.  In the nineties, according to 
an annual report on The Advancement of Women on ASEAN, the distribution of females 
and males in mid-top level position in Brunei Darussalam was 27.2 percent for females 
and 72.8 percent for males.93  
In other words, there was one woman to every three men in mid-top level 
positions around the time many of these businesswomen were employed by the 
government. I had also heard opinions from my casual interactions with other Malay 
Muslims women in Brunei that although women dominated institutes of higher education 
they were not easily found in higher echelons of the public workforce. To quote one 
popular blog from a popular critical website on Brunei:  
 
Yesterday, during the Hari Belia at the Indoor Stadium, I noted that the quadrant 
where I was seated, among the Deputy Ministers, Constitutional Appointments, 
Judges, PS, DPS and Senior Directors, there were only about 7 ladies among the 
60 odd people among us in that quadrant.94  
 
While another blog noted with conviction, “Males do seem to get promoted faster 
than their female counterparts in most sectors of government.”95 The case for an 
argument of sexual discrimination in Brunei certainly does seem possible.96 Further 
investigation suggests that gender may not be the only factor obstructing the women’s 
promotion possibilities. Regardless of gender discrimination, there were few vacancies at 
senior levels in the governmental bureaucracy. In order to promote these women, more 
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95 Ibid. 
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senior employees had to be promoted or had to resign. Senior employees in Brunei have 
been notorious or their reluctance to retire early. There have been several reports of this 
agenda being put forth by senior government officials to push the current retirement age 
in the government sector jobs is at 55 years.97 However, since a vast majority of the 
country’s population is dependent on the government for their employment, any raise in 
the retirement age would have severe budgetary consequences. Hence not only were 
gender prejudices preventing the members of the WBC from attaining promotions, there 
was also the added factor of the limited available senior positions. 
 
The Missing Allure of the Private Sector 
 
 As discussed earlier, members of the WBC had stagnant careers in the 
government sector in the nineties because of their inability to get promoted. However, we 
have yet to understand why many did not find another source of employment. More 
specifically, why did they not quit their public sector jobs and join the private sector? 
The governmental bureaucracy of Brunei consists of a huge apparatus comprising 
12 ministries and 101 government departments and agencies. The government is by far 
the largest employer in the country. Almost two thirds of employed Malay Muslim 
citizens of Brunei work for government sector institutions.98 Not surprisingly, the 
majority of Malay Muslim workingwomen in Brunei used to work for the government. 
They were attracted by the high minimum wage structures, generous maternity benefits 
and job security in public sector positions. Moreover, a generous compensation was 
awarded to mothers to accommodate additional expenses incurred for rearing children.  
Another important reason why women find government jobs particularly 
appealing is that "the gender wage gap hardly exists in the public sector due to the 
uniformed pay scale... Not so much in the private sector, according to Research and 
Development statistics at the Universiti Brunei Darussalam, men on average earn 28 
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98 Mahmud, Hadi. “Call to hike bonus of civil servants.” The Brunei Times, 8 March 2008. 
 61
percent more than women in all occupations in the private sector in Brunei."99 Moreover, 
Malay Muslim women graduates of higher institutions have been the most privileged 
because they have been guaranteed jobs in the government sector for so long.100 Hence, it 
appears logical that local Bruneian women prefer to serve in government jobs.  
If Malay Muslim women do work in a less lucrative private sector job, it is rarely 
out of choice. Mariam, a boutique owner and member of the WBC confirmed that “some 
of [her] friends worked with the private sector but they just worked there temporarily as a 
stepping-stone to better government jobs.”  So did Mona Shaheed, a bookshop owner, 
who asked:  
Why would anyone want to work extra hard. It is human. When the government 
is offering such a high pay and 30 hour weeks, it makes no sense why someone 
will want to work for low wages and much longer working hours!101  
 
While not all private sector jobs are as demanding, Mona is accurate to suggest 
that the government sector job has clear advantages. Another substantial insight was 
offered by Hiza Haji Ahmed, a party food caterer and senior member if the WBC, 
“Moreover did you know that the government cannot fire you if you a Malay Muslim? In 
private sector companies, one day you are genuinely sick or you come in late, they cut 
your salary. Sometimes they can even fire you! In government job we used to get any 
number of sick days if we were really ill.”102 Conditions like higher wages, lesser 
working hours and job security appear to reinforce the preference for public sector jobs 
amongst Malay Muslim women in Brunei. Hence almost 75 percent of public sector is 
currently held by Malay Muslims while less than 25 percent of Malay-Muslims work in 
private sector.  
The benefits to working for the government are in contrast to the very 
competitive, low paying and highly demanding private sector job positions.103 Even if 
women decide to join the private sector, there is no regulatory body or mediator to 
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represent the views of private sector employees in Brunei. The WBC members also 
confirmed that Brunei offers very few avenues for workingwomen or even men to 
independently address their work problems in the private sector. Conventional labour 
practices like allowing the formation of trade unions or organizations with collective 
bargaining power are illegal in Brunei’s public sector. Trade unions in Brunei are allowed 
in the private sector but they are to be compulsorily registered. Predictably, the 
conditions for registration are not conducive to the development of trade unions.104 So 
far, only three trade unions exist in the oil sector.105 Hence in Brunei, the private sector 
offers a precarious career option when compared to the public sector. 
Almost all the fifteen interviewed women felt disenchanted with their progress in 
their respective ministerial or bureaucratic jobs. The promise of promotions or pay rise 
after a certain stage in their career was almost impossible. The above-mentioned points 
clarify not only why the government was unconditionally the ‘employer of choice’ when 
the WBC members were looking for jobs. They also explain why these women did not 
consider the private sector an option when they became dissatisfied as civil servants. As 
long as these Malay Muslim women wished to work in Brunei, their choice of potential 
employers remained limited to the government sector only.  
Given that switching to the private sector jobs was not an option when these WBC 
women became dissatisfied with their government jobs, many became attracted to the 
promise of fortune and new challenges of opening their own businesses. They decided to 
accept the voluntary retirement scheme encouraged by the government when they saw 
this promise. Mariam the tailoring boutique owner, for instance, divulged, “It is a very 
logical decision as the government was conducting many training programs to encourage 
women to start their own businesses. Many of my friends also took the opportunity” She 
was quick to add that she got a handsome monthly pension: “Same money without any 
working hours.”106 The opportunity to retire with full compensation appeared as a 
blessing. 
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In Brunei, pension was raised from 10 Brunei dollars107 during the fifties to over 
100 Brunei dollars a month in 1990. While the official retirement age of public sector 
employees is fifty-five, many of these WBC women such as Hizah resigned at the early 
age of thirty-five. The voluntary retirement scheme was so attractive that almost 90 
percent of the 9500 public sector employees opted for the Voluntary Retirement 
Program.108 Many WBC members resigned at the end of May 2002 and were soon 
released from their civil position where they started their businesses.109  
Some however took voluntary retirement scheme earlier in the late 90s and started 
their own businesses a little earlier. These businesswomen told me that their government 
jobs at the various Ministries had internal compulsory training programs for employees to 
encourage early retirement and to think about proprietorship. In fact, in the last decade, 
the Government of Brunei launched many new programs for public sector employees 
with the objective of creating a pool of entrepreneurs. The program consisted of various 
entrepreneurship trainings, short-term courses, workshops, seminars, and conferences. 
These seminars covered areas such as finance, marketing, managing, standard, and 
quality control and the use of information and communication technology. Hizah, the 
food caterer, too attended these programs and became convinced that she “could do it too. 
Otherwise who would have thought an old woman like me can be so business-minded?”  
When these WBC opted to retire early, they were given a large lump sum of cash 
in the form of accumulated gratuity for their service to the Ministry. The Voluntary 
Retirement compensation package is calculated on the basis of one months’ salary for 
every two complete years of service plus nine months’ salary.110 These WBC 
businesswomen used this amount as the start-up capital for their companies.   
The government even offered to give them loans when they submitted proposals 
for businesses on their return from such training programs.  Besides the financial support, 
the training programs provided them with opportunities to know about entrepreneurial 
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skills for their businesses. Government assistance also came in the form of incubation 
program, technical and business advisory services, and infrastructure assistance. The 
government’s liberal sponsorship and funding of Malay-Muslim women’s entrepreneurial 
ventures played the most significant role for my respondents to become entrepreneurs.111 
 
The Businesswomen’s Economic Position 
 
One pertinent question however remained: How could these women afford to take 
a risk with their hard-earned savings? What if their business ventures turned out to be 
losses? Would it not have catastrophic results on their standards of living? It might be 
acceptable if they were unmarried or had no children, but as a member of an extended 
family with in-laws and children, one would imagine such a drastic career move would 
be opposed by their kin. How did their families accept their decision to risk their earnings 
and savings? To answer such questions, I refer back to my informants. 
 Mariam, the tailoring boutique owner, shared some details about her economic 
background. Her husband works in the Brunei Shell Oil Company in a senior managerial 
position. In short, Mariam’s family does not depend on her income for their upper-
middle-class standard of living. This financial security is a crucial characteristic of 
women in Brunei who chose to retire early in order to start a business. These women 
often belong to privileged wealthy families. As Mariam proclaimed, “I do not need this 
money, it is not only about money. I have money. Now I want to make a name for 
myself. I want to become someone illustrious.” Their goal to pursue a business is not 
necessarily to make ends meet, but to challenge themselves to reach new heights.  
Even Mona, the bookshop owner, shared a similar economic status with Mariam. 
Her husband is the personal assistant to a Senior Minster in the Finance Department. She 
explained that: 
If my family was depending on my money, then of course I would not have 
risked it. My children are married and can take care of themselves and their 
families. They do not need me or my husband to support them anymore. My 
family will support whatever I do because I know what is best for them.112  
 
                                                 
111 Economic Planning Unit, Fifth National Development Plan, 1986-1990. 
112 Ibid. 
 65
In fact, all WBC members have comparable family wealth and stature. For 
example, earlier in my research when I was looking for the WBC office, the website 
notes that the organization is located at an upscale service-apartment complex called 
D’Anggrek. As I later figured out, this posh location could be explained by the fact that 
the owner of this upscale complex, Datin Sumeria, was  also the President of the WBC 
when the organization moved into this office space. According to WBC regulation, the 
President must arrange an alternative location, preferably a place that would not charge 
rent for the functioning of the WBC. Such a requirement implicitly implies that executive 
committee members must have certain economic statue or influence. Even the restaurant 
where the WBC members usually meet is owned by one of the organization’s senior 
members.  
There are however some exceptions. Hizah, a food caterer, on the other hand, is 
not married to a very wealthy man in contrast to the cases of Mariam and Mona. Her 
husband according to her is an ‘ordinary hardworking Bruneian.’ He works as a low-level 
manager of a small section of the Electricity and Water Department of the Government. 
However, Hizah was not concerned by her different economic circumstance. She 
explained why: “My husband inherited a big house as he was an adopted son to my in-
laws because they had no children of their own. It came with large backyard and garden 
and that is enough for us. My children are working abroad and they are successful. I am 
not wealthy, but I am not needy also.”113 While one could argue that Hizah’s husband 
may not be as wealthy as the other businesswomen’s husbands, he has however inherited 
a considerable fortune. The important point here to note is that all the WBC members are 
privileged women who do not lack in material comforts. 
One cannot ignore this privileged background of the WBC businesswomen when 
considering their readiness to risk their savings or assets in order to start their business as 
they entered middle-age. All of these women are wives of affluent men in Brunei – a 
position which allowed them greater degree of economic freedom to start their own 
business. Other women in families whose household income depends on both the 
husband and wife’s earning capacities would not be able to afford such a liberty. Thus 
financial security is a vital circumstance enjoyed by the WBC businesswomen which 
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While one could argue that the members of the WBC started their business 
primarily because the government encouraged them to do so, their job dissatisfaction was 
another cause for their action. Not only were they not promoted, they also found their 
government jobs tedious even though they were working for the preferred employer of 
the country: the government. When we gathered a comprehensive understanding of the 
work circumstances in the public and private sector in Brunei and the personal aspirations 
of the WBC member, we can understand why they resigned their jobs despite being in 
senior government positions and opted to start small companies. Apart from job 
environments, many of the WBC members became entrepreneurs as they were attracted 
to the new challenges posed of becoming their own employers. While many of the 
businesswomen came from privileged backgrounds, their courageous decisions to move 
beyond their comfort-zones to venture into the uncertain world of business must be 
acknowledged. Despite their lack of previous experience, they tried to learn, toil and 
master a new skill – the skill of running a company. In many ways they could be 
considered inspiring models for other Brunei women in their relentless pursuit to create a 
better career for themselves. 
In the next chapter, I explore some of the difficulties faced by the WBC members 
in their business ventures and how they attempt to negotiate with the government and 













Government Policy and Businesswomen (2000-Present) 
 
After more than a decade in operation, many small and medium sized businesses 
in Brunei came under economic difficulties during the nineties. Factors like dwindling 
markets for their goods and services with the decline in tourism, stagnant wages, 
inflation, and competition from the rapid development of neighboring countries like 
Malaysia and Indonesia began to take a severe toll on their profitability. However, these 
unfavorable economic conditions could not be considered ‘surprising’ given the existing 
state of political economy in Brunei at this time. Scholars have appointed to the declining 
economic conditions during this era as a consequence of short-sighted government 
policies.114  
For instance, the government created an indulgent public sector where the 
majority of its citizens were government employees with high wage scales but which 
resulted in high local labor costs in the country. The government also excessively relied 
upon imports leading to the high costs of raw materials. Furthermore, it failed to develop 
a strong local manufacturing and agricultural base for its economy. Consequences of such 
political economy impacted the WBC women’s businesses, many of whose businesses 
were under a decade old at this time. The women’s SMEs suffered a range of problems as 
a result of the wider economic situation in Brunei. For example, the high minimum wage 
expectations of Malay Muslims Bruneians made it very difficult for the small companies 
that they owned to hire local labor. For some of these WBC women, the excessive 
dependence on imports due to a lack of local manufacturing industries severely increased 
the cost of raw materials for their small enterprises which dramatically reduced their 
profitability and many closed down.115 This chapter will first elaborate on the kinds of 
problems small businesswomen face as a result of previous government policies.  
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Having clarified the problems they encountered, the second section enquires into 
how the WBC members resolved the economic challenges faced by their businesses.  
Discussions here will attempt to explore the extent to which the WBC enhances the 
ability of businesswomen to parley for some latitude from government policies. I explore 
press releases, published pamphlets, and the official website of the WBC in order to 
deduce how this organization facilitates negotiations with the government and support the 
interests of businesswomen in Brunei. I will corroborate these findings with my own 
interviews with the members of the organization. An in-depth examination of the 
objectives and structural positioning of the WBC reveals that it does not provide enough 
assistance to businesswomen. The main cause for this is structural inefficiency is because 
WBC had not invested with any form of collective bargaining power or in any position to 
act as a mediator to influence government policy on SMEs and women in business at the 
time of its establishment. Interestingly, WBC members were well aware of the inherent 
and structural limitations of WBC even before joining. 
The last section of the chapter explores the question why these businesswomen 
opted to join the WBC despite knowing its limitations in affecting government decisions 
on SMEs and women in business. It considers why members still consider the WBC a 
worthwhile organization to join. The answers, I show, lie in the creative ways in which 
these businesswomen resolved their economic problems independently, as a collective, 
instead of merely relying on government handouts and favors. My interviews show how, 
as an organization, the WBC, plays an indirectly role by providing comrade  amongst 
these women to learn, and support each other, as they resolve their business challenges on 
their own. At times their comrade leads to even illegal measures in order to cut costs and 
help sustain their businesses. For example, when, the cost of cloth was too high, some 
WBC members narrated their clandestine experience of smuggling in bales of cloth 
through unregulated custom checkpoints from Malaysia. At other times, when they 
needed to reduce labor costs, they worked together to ‘influence their contacts’ in order 
to receive extra migrant worker permits for migrants beyond the legal entitlements 
allowed for their businesses.  
These women’s stories indicate that that the members of the WBC benefited from 
being members of the organization as they were able to share ideas and learn from each 
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other in order to find creative, albeit at times illegal ones, to sustain their businesses at an 
economic challenging time in the Brunei economy. A majority of WBC members found it 
more effective to evade the government authorities and policies than to confront or 
negotiate directly with the official powers.  
My interviews show how these women did not see each other as competitors but 
felt that they were ‘together in a struggle to make their businesses successful.’116 The 
survival tactics advocated and employed invariably involved a degree of evading the 
power and interactions with the government. Recognizing these women’s abilities to 
solve their own problems has important implications for our understanding of the role 
played by the WBC in maintaining these women’s current economic position. While the 
WBC has little negotiation power according to its official mandate, it has played a crucial 
role in providing a valuable space for these businesswomen to support each other as they 
resolve their business problems. The informal advice and solutions shared amongst 
members as they carved their own strategies outside of seeking government support show 
the value of WBC to them. Hence, while the WBC does not have a formal role in 
negotiating with the government, it is nevertheless an organization which helps foster a 
sense of community and comrade amongst its members who benefit from the exchange of 
ideas, and strategies in order to improve their own businesses.   
By elucidating the reasons why the WBC members find it worthwhile to 
participate in the WBC, some critical implications come to light. The WBC 
businesswomen have emerged as an economic class with a unique relationship with the 
government because they fulfill the government’s wish to expand the private sector and 
to reduce the state’s burden as main employer in the country. The findings in this chapter 
reinstate the main argument of this thesis on the emergence of businesswomen as an 
emerging social-economic group with a unique relationship within the government 
because they were created by, yet also independent from, the government. This chapter 
highlights how members of the WBC thrive on their own despite and not because of 
government assistance even though they were created out of government policies. 
 
 
                                                 




In this section, I elaborate on the obstacles faced and the solutions enacted by 
some of the WBC businesswomen. Narratives from these women show that many of their 
problems are often the result of the wider economic stagnancy of short-sighted 
government policies.  
Yanti Yazdi, a fifty-three year food caterer and original member of the WBC, 
seemed weary of her company’s future when I interviewed her. Yanti used to be an 
assistant to the Ambassador of Brunei to France and voluntarily resigned from her job in 
1998 in order to start her own tailoring outlet which employed seven employees when it 
began. Her company organizes simple meals and gourmet buffets for functions and 
parties. However soon after starting her business, she encountered a problem of getting 
more employees due to the government’s new regulations in restricting migrant labour 
during the late nineties. Every company in Brunei must apply for a legal worker permit 
for every non-citizen they hire. However, a small company often cannot qualify for 
foreign workers’ permits as the government has a policy of protecting these positions for 
the local population. This policy measure was introduced to encourage the development 
of local skills as the government endeavoured to control the number of expatriates in the 
country or “Bruneization’” in the private sector. As part of the country's ‘Bruneization’ 
program, the percentage of jobs held by Brunei nationals was supposed to be at least 30 
percent by the end of 2005.117 Hence, since the new millennium, the government has 
become relentlessly strict in approving foreign workers’ permits.  
         However, small company owners like Yanti cannot afford hiring local Bruneians 
due to high costs of local wages. Expressing her disappointment, Yanti said, “The 
government has minimum wages that have to be paid if we hire a Bruneian and even that 
local workers expect their salaries to be comparable with the wages in government jobs. 
But I cannot afford to pay the level of salaries my government pays!” Explicitly resentful 
of the new restrictions on foreign workers’, Yanti expressed, “Hiring local workers is too 
expensive so I thought I would expand my business by hiring foreign caterers. This is the 
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only way to cut costs.”  Yanti could not reduce her costs for food because the prices for 
food were already fixed. Since Brunei imports all of its food, it is impossible to negotiate 
the price of food. If there was any operating cost that Yanti could reduce, it would have 
to be only the costs of labour.  
Yanti had spoken to some government officials at the Ministry of Labour on her 
labour woes, but to no avail: “I explained my situation but they said that no one can 
change government rules and brushed me aside.”  She had seen many food caterers shut 
their businesses over the past few years because they were unable to cope with the cost of 
high labour and the difficult economic situation. She explained, “Many of my 
competitors are no longer in the business scene. We have also become no longer any 
cheaper than the restaurants, so who would come to us to provide food for their parties or 
meetings?”118 Faced with rising costs and competition, Yanti had no choice but to hire 
foreign workers at her food catering business. Yanti justified her resolution in the 
following way, “I have a small company and my business is not doing well. I cannot 
afford local Bruneians as employees.” Evidently disillusioned by the government 
restriction on foreign workers for small businesses, Yanti told me that she would fight to 
keep her business going as long as she could. 
Another member of the WBC also talked of her resentment about the hindrance of 
government policy on the growth of her business. Raina Haji Mohammad, a fifty-one 
year old retired government hospital nurse who opened a medium-sized boutique in 
Kulau Belait, told me that tourists were her most important customers. Raina was angry 
about what she saw as government negligence in developing the tourism industry in 
Brunei, unlike its neighbour Malaysia. For businesswomen like Raina who depended on 
tourists as costumers for her shop, the government’s neglect in promoting the tourist 
sector was the biggest obstacle faced. Raina explained, “Tourists used to buy our 
traditional costumes as souvenirs. They used to be a big market here but in recent years 
they have stopped coming.” 119 The dwindling numbers of tourist visitors to Brunei are no 
doubt a setback to Raina’s business.  
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However due to a slowing economy in Brunei, Raina’ local customers had also 
become smaller and thus she could not fall back on local customers. Raina explained that 
many of her clients, who were predominantly Malay Muslim women, had stopped buying 
clothes from her shop. Raina’s problems were also aggravated by competition from the 
garment industries in Indonesia and Malaysia. These countries have significantly cheaper 
material prices for fabric and textiles than Brunei as these raw materials are often locally 
produced. This difference in pricing has caused a situation where many Bruneians go out 
of the country to shop for clothes and textiles rather than shop at local outlets such as the 
one owned by Raina. 
Raina initially resorted to absorbing costs herself and offering huge discounts in 
order to attract customers. However this was not a feasible long term strategy and Raina 
eventually could not offer any more discounts. Instead she turned to cutting costs of her 
raw materials as a solution. She first tried to acquire cheaper fabric in Brunei but since all 
the fabric is imported in Brunei, the lowest costs she could find were not sufficient for 
her to sustain her business. Raina explained that she had already found the cheapest 
supplier in Brunei. She elaborated in the following way, “Most of my competitors were 
also buying from this same supplier which I had found. So he was already the cheapest 
supplier one could find in Brunei yet the cost was still too high if my business wants to 
survive. So what could I do?” Not only did Raina face the problem of being unable to 
further lower the cost of her raw materials, the limited supply and demand market in 
Brunei also meant that she had no competitive edge over other boutiques because they all 
bought from the same supplier. The competition was undoubtedly intense. 
Raina alluded to the incapacity of Brunei’s economy to develop strong indigenous 
industries that could replace the dependence on imports.120 Given Brunei’s small 
population and high financial reserves, the government found it more economical and 
convenient to import products than developing indigenous industries. The intrinsic 
economic inability of resource rich exporting nations like Brunei to develop productive 
local industries has been exhaustively studied. A similar situation is also found in 
countries like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and the Netherlands. This 
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phenomenon has been termed as the ‘Dutch disease’ in mainstream economic and 
political science scholarship.121 
The lack of development of domestic manufacturing sector or non-oil based 
primary industries has had a severe impact on a range of small businesses in Brunei. As 
Raina lamented, “Few businesses could withstand the rising cost of importing products 
without a means of reducing costs.” Inevitable these are difficult times for small business 
owners in Brunei. However, but some of the WBC women had found other measures to 
help alleviate their business losses.  
Another struggling businesswoman is Fateeha Mohammad Hafeez who used to 
work for the Brunei Foreign Services in London - inevitably a high paying senior 
government position. She quit her job in 1999 and started a business in a rare field for 
businesswomen. She started a construction business. The construction industry is a male-
dominated one in Brunei. Hence it is hardly surprising when Fateeha told me of the 
immense difficulties she faced at the beginning of her business in convincing her client 
about her abilities and to take her company as ‘seriously’ as they would of other male-
owned companies.122  
Fateeha’s biggest customer is the Brunei government, largely in the form of 
government agencies such as the Ministry of Housing and Ministry of Urban 
Development. She explained, “In Brunei, most constructions are undertaken by the 
government for the government. So we have to tender in costs quotations for advertised 
projects to the government for their consideration. Often, whoever quoted the least costs 
would acquire the contract for the project.”123 Fateeha explained that while all 
construction companies could bid for government contracts, in reality this process was far 
from fair. This is because relatives of government employees who own construction 
companies often have an edge in these open tenders as they have inside contacts. Fateeha 
confessed that her company was able to survive because of the contacts she had in these 
government ministries given that she was a former senior government servant. 
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Nevertheless she also talked about her frustrations as the currying of favours within the 
government was also competitive as many other construction companies had better 
‘contacts’ than her. She lamented to me, “I have come to know through my sources that 
sometimes the prices quoted are much higher than the ones I submitted yet these 
companies were given the government jobs. The government has so much money it does 
not care really. But what about us who are struggling to survive?” While Fateeha’s 
company occasionally wins government contracts, these projects are sufficient to sustain 
her company. Thus when I last spoke with her, Fateeha was apprehensive on whether the 
sustainability of company in the future. 
From the above narratives, there is little doubt that the government indirectly 
creates many obstacles for small business owners like the WBC women. Given the 
overview of the problems encountered and their links with government policies, we next 
look at how these women solved these obstacles. For this, we need to revisit the role 
played by the WBC and its ability to intervene and assist these women with their 
problems.  
 
Assessing the Role of the WBC  
 
If we recollect from Chapter One, according to WBC’s mission statement, its 
goals are “to unite and assist women on common interests and concerns and to provide 
training and development.”124 I begin my evaluation of the effectiveness of WB by 
looking at its second objective, that is, in “providing training and development” to 
businesswomen. How does the WBC train and develop SMEs in Brunei? Does it sponsor 
its members to attend training programs? Does it have a fund allocated to help the 
businesses of its members expand?  By answering such questions, we will be in a better 
position to evaluate the extent to which the WBC is in a position to be of assistance to 
these women. 
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WBC was created under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Industry and 
Primary Resources. However, it is important to note that the Ministry’s Resource and 
Standards Center is responsible in approving support for local small and medium 
enterprises. Aspiring businesswomen could directly access training opportunities under 
the entrepreneurial development program to venture into the business field. Therefore 
businesswomen who are not members of WBC could also have access to training 
programs sponsored by the government. Moreover, the WBC cannot administer or 
influence government decisions on loan applications. Do the WBC does have the 
capacity to suggest loan approvals for its members. The objectives and achievements of 
this organization reveal that it has very limited powers. Any businesswoman or aspiring 
businesswoman could avail to the benefits of the government’s liberal funding 
opportunities without being a member of the WBC. Hence, the tangible benefits to 
joining the WBC are very limited. 
I asked the members of the WBC if they had ever attended government training 
programs. Raina, the food caterer, waved her hands immediately, “Oh no, I already went 
to training programs three years before I joined WBC.” Many of other WBC members 
also indicated that they had been on training programs sponsored by the government 
before they left the civil service sector before they became WBC members. Since they 
were retired senior government employees, most of them had used their gratuity and 
retirement compensation funds to finance their businesses.125 They had minimal financial 
expectations from the government to run their businesses. Therefore it is clear that they 
did not join the WBC expecting material benefits from the association.  
At this point Mariam’s explanation for the inefficiency of the WBC may be 
helpful for us to understand why these women still joined the WBC although they knew 
about its limitations from the start: 
The WBC in many ways is like another women’s organization at the end of the 
day. We have minimal expectations from the government because with the way 
Brunei is now, we are realistic. There is no use to bang your head on stone. Only 
your head will bleed. We luckily do not need the government that much also.126  
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Mariam’s metaphorical response conveyed the shared sentiments amongst WBC 
members clearly. Given the political structure of Brunei, it would be naïve to think that a 
woman’s association could influence government policy in any tangible way. Fateeha 
expressed a similar informed yet jaded sentiment: 
How can we depend on the government when they are so pre-occupied with other 
things? The fact of the matter is they do not want to let go of their power and 
anyone who can negotiate with them is seen as a threat. Hence only people who 
agree with them are in positions to negotiate…so how? In our country, we cannot 
do anything to change our leadership’s viewpoint. We just wait and wait for the 
day they realize it. But in the meantime we try and make our dreams come 
true.127 
 
 Fateeha expressed her regret on how inefficient the government was in addressing 
businesswomen’s problems as she pointed to the government’s lackadaisical attitude, 
“No sense of urgency whatsoever. How can we ever become like Singapore or America if 
we are so slow? The staff is so inefficient and ignorant about the reality of business in 
Brunei that I just avoid them altogether.”128 Yanti, the caterer, added to emphasize the 
government’s lack of touch with reality from her personal experience: “I once went to the 
Ministry of Industry about my labour problem. They told me they would call. After 8 
months I was fed up of waiting so I complained, they told me to wait like everyone else 
and I was not ‘special.’ They take so long for every little thing.” 129   
In fact, many of the WBC members shared this resentment about the economic 
stagnancy of their country and their government’s disinterest in reforming the economy. 
It was because they knew that there was not much point in coming with strategies to 
negotiate with the government, members of the WBC had unanimously decided from the 
beginning of their organization that they would not hold regular meetings like other 
women’s organizations. Rather they were practical that the WBC would be more 
effective spending less time trying to lobby for policy change and use its time to facilitate 
networking amongst businesswomen. Hence as noted in the first chapter, the WBC is 
amongst the least active of the national women’s organizations found in Brunei. 
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However, despite such inactivity, the WBC has almost fifty women members and its 
membership is still growing. In the next section we consider why these shrewd 
businesswomen still found it worthwhile to join the WBC.  
 
Informal Solutions and the Significance of the WBC 
 
As the previous section shows, the WBC cannot effectively address many of the 
businesswomen’s problems because of its incapacity to directly negotiate with the 
various ministries of the government. We also know how this shortcoming is evident to 
WBC members. In this section I explore some of the indirect or covert ways in which the 
WBC may have helped these women to solve their business challenges.  
Yanti, the food caterer, as noted before had problems with acquiring foreign 
worker permits in order to expand her catering businesses. If we recollect, she did not 
qualify for foreign workers’ permits because she owned a small enterprise130 which 
created a dilemma for her as she could not afford hiring local workers. At this point, a 
fellow WBC member led her to an undercover operation that ‘sold’ worker permits. Her 
friend informed her of a few clandestine businesses which were registered in the name of 
fictitious large-scale companies with no real operations. With such a business license 
such companies automatically qualifies for multiple worker permits. These permits are in 
turn ‘sold’ to small business owners who are in dire need for foreign workers but could 
not have legal access to them. Apparently the high demand for foreign worker permits 
has led some Brunei citizens to make quick money by trading foreign workers’ permits. 
Yanti was relieved to know of their existence and ‘bought” five worker permits to 
resurrect her ailing business.   
As Yanti narrated her story, she mocked at the government’s inability to limit the 
pervasiveness of such fake enterprises with this comment: 
The government makes such a big deal of this Bruneization policy and right 
under their own noses some senior officials run such opportunistic agencies 
like this. I did not care about rules either because those rules don’t care about 
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my business. I did not feel morally obliged to follow such laws. So I went to 
the agency.131  
 
Yanti’s justification for her decision reflected a genuine frustration over the 
government’s contradictory policies. Moreover she found no harm in exploiting what she 
deemed as an inherently hypocritical and flawed system. Her choice to disregard 
government policy was indeed common amongst businesswomen in the WBC. These 
WBC women can be considered unique because they are proactive in finding alternative 
solutions to their business problems.  Today, Yanti’s business employs twelve 
employees: eight Indonesians, two Bruneians, in addition to herself and her daughter.  
In the similar vein, another WBC member, a good friend of Yanti’s, Maznah 
Hamdan, used an ingenious ploy to evade having to pay the hefty employee deposit for 
foreign workers to the Labor Ministry. She declared her employees as partners of her 
company holding a 0.001 percent stake in her small company. By doing so, she did not 
have to pay them much in terms of profits and was still able to avoid the mandatory 
employee deposits. Many of the women interviewed shared the resort to such subversive 
labour strategies in order to evade the government labour imposition. 
Raina Mohammad, the boutique owner who had a hard time cutting her raw 
material costs, found another creative solution to her predicament. She took the advice of 
one of her colleagues at the WBC who suggested that she hired a transportation company 
to import fabrics from Malaysia. Her friend informed her that she could contact a few 
private bus companies in Brunei which commute between the borders of Brunei and 
Malaysia. Those buses had large storage compartments left unused by everyday 
commuters. Liking her friend’s proposition, Raina made a very profitable deal with one a 
textile mill in Sarawak to supply her with high quality material at exceptionally reduced 
prices. She was happy that this strategy enabled her to significantly reduce her costs. She 
was also able to make alternative arrangements to bring the materials into Brunei without 
paying duty. She explained her clandestine operation in the following way:  
Twice a week, I send some of my women employees to Malaysia to bring back 
bales and bales of cheap cloth as their own luggage. Sometimes it fills up 10-15 
                                                 
131 Yazdi, Yanti. “Personal  Interview” 22 December 2007. 
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cartons. Since it’s a bus, there is no weight limit and if anyone asked, they 
could say it was for their family. But who is going to ask two simple looking 
Muslim women if they are smugglers?132  
 
Not only was Raina bold to take this strategy, she was also shrewd in knowing 
that Brunei customs at its borders were often more preoccupied with regulating arms and 
drugs rather than with the smuggling of textiles. She was confident that no one would 
catch a “Malay woman with a lot of clothes!” She was perceptive to admit, “Let us face 
it, people want cheap clothes. They do not care if a Bruneian stitched it or an Indonesian, 
least of all if it is illegally imported fabric!”133  Raina had no qualms sharing her strategy 
with other WBC members, “I give this idea to whoever has the same problems as me. 
They know it worked for me”134 Raina’s strategy to retain her competitive edge amongst 
boutique owners in Kulau Belait is imaginative, effective, albeit, illegal. Raina’ story, not 
only reveals how the WBC women navigate around strict or unchanging government 
policies but also how these women readily share their business secrets with each other. 
Many of the members of the WBC share a sense of solidarity with each other through 
their business experiences. 
Due to the rising costs of imports, Wiwiek, another senior member of the WBC, 
had to recently close her handicraft workshop and relocated it to Malaysia instead. By 
doing so, she could get very cheap handicrafts made in Malaysia and then sell them at a 
premium costs in Bandar Seri Begawan. Since she owned both the production and 
distribution companies on each side of the border, she only had to pay a very small 
import duty. By relocating her business to Malaysia, she did not then have to hire local 
craftsmen or apply for foreign workers’ permits. As a result, she was able to beat her 
competitors by selling her products at a much cheaper price in Bandar Seri Begawan. 
In other cases such as  Fateeha, who ran a construction company, was even more 
resourceful when she re-registered her company under her husband’s name as a solution 
to her problem in getting customers in a profoundly male-dominated field. By re-
registering her company under her husband’s name, she was able to avoid sexism by 
                                                 




claiming that she was working for a male-owned company. She explained that she had to 
“pretend to be an employee of her company.” Since her husband is an important 
government official, she said that “it made my company look serious”135 However, this 
measure was not enough to improve her business prospects immediately.. Another WBC 
member had advised her to develop contacts within the Ministry of Urban Development. 
This member, whose brother held a senior position in that Ministry, eventually helped put 
Fateeha on to him. Fateeha divulged her strategy: 
 I was first nervous and scared to stoop so low and become dishonest in my 
dealings. But finally I convinced myself that if I wanted to remain in this race I 
had no choice. So I went to meet him and he indicated that he would expect a 
commission in return. Since he was already being offered 10 percent, I suggested 
15. I knew it was not the right way to do business. I thought instead of 
complaining or fighting a law suit that I will definitely lose, I just played along.136  
 
 Fateeha was grateful to her colleague in helping her revive her business and 
laughed when she said, “[the senior officer in the Ministry] is now my loyal customer and 
the rest is history!”137 We see, just like we did in the case of Yanti, Fateeha’s company 
was under pressures by both business competition and restricting government policies. 
Instead of giving up, she manipulated the system to her advantage. By securing good 
government contacts, Fateeha not ‘remains in the race” but she also got ahead of many of 
her competitors in the construction industry. 
The above stories narrated the innovative ways trough which WBC members 
addressed their business problems. Their solutions share a common theme: they share a 
common goal of not pushing for change in government policies but avoiding or 
circumventing them instead. The avoidance of direct interaction and confrontation with 
the government was intentional because these businesswomen were well aware of the 
behavioural tendencies and the red-tape in government bureaucracies. The 
businesswomen found friends and comrades amongst WBC members from whom they 
sought advice and help to find alternative solutions to their business woes. We see from 
                                                 




the above accounts that members of the WBC seek to circumvent government 
intervention.  
One could conclude that although the WBC does not offer any direct financial or 
managerial assistance to its members, this organization plays the role of a sorority which 
offers solace, support, and alternative solutions to each other’s business woes. After all, it 
was from other WBC members whom Yanti, Raina, and Fateeha found advice and ideas 
on how to procure worker permits, use bus companies to transport raw materials and 
make ‘contacts’ to crack deals – although their solutions may be ethically wrong and 
illegal. These stories show how the WBC businesswomen supported each other and how 
the WBC does bring certain hidden benefits to its members. It is this recognition of the 
importance of networking and support that lead many women like Raina, the boutique 
owner to conclude that, “It is more useful to turn to our own friends here at the WBC, we 
know what is going on. Usually we can solve each other’s problems more quickly than 
the government.”138 Genuinely cherishing her membership at WBC, Raina said,  
“The WBC has helped me so many times. That too since we are all on the 
same page, we offer each other suitable advice. We all know not to 
suggest negotiating with the Ministry, it is useless.”139  
 
In the case of Yanti, she explained why she joined the WBC:  
To keep abreast with other women’s developments in businesses. Sometimes 
they know some important strategies that I may not and vice versa. We are not 
competitive in that sense. We know our fate is linked.140  
 
The WBC can be seen as facilitating meaningful social and psychological support 
for these women by enabling them to share their experience and problems and to help 
each other out in times of economic distress. Fateeha pined that this “sorority-like” 
organization was unlike any other she could find in the following way:  
 
                                                 




My friends at the WBC are the only people who actually understood my 
problems. Many times at family gatherings or even with my other working 
girlfriends, I start ranting about my business and they really do not understand 
what I am talking about. Being a businesswoman is very lonely because it has its 
own type of worries.141  
 
           Members like Fateeha find it useful to communicate and interact with other WBC 
businesswomen from their own age-group. They value the fact that they can share or 
discuss their woes with other EBC members and not just with other family members and 
friends. In fact, all the WBC members whom I interviewed hold very similar reasons for 
joining the WBC. Therefore the existence of the WBC can be understood in terms of its 
ability to provide meaningful representation and support for businesswomen who can 
relate to, and help each other, without needing help from the government. Borrowing the 
words of Raina, the WBC is an important vehicle for Malay Muslim businesswomen to 
“keep in touch with the pulse of their craft.”142 
From the sentiments of the WBC members, we can come to a more holistic 
conceptualization of the actual role played by the WBC for businesswomen in Brunei.  
From the above assessments, it would be fair to assert that while the WBC is not in a 
position to live up to its second listed objective of providing training to its members,, it is 
however able to meet its first aim, that is, “to unite and assist women on common 
interests”143 The WBC provides an exclusive yet crucial space for businesswomen to 





This chapter begins with the business problems faced by WBC members. But we 
have seen how the WBC members are proactive about their problems. They rely on 
themselves and each other as a community to help resolve the obstacles faced in their 
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businesses. We can also affirm with certainty that they do not want to approach the 
government with their problems or hold any desire for WBC to broker negotiations with, 
or special appeals to the government on their behalf. They hold a sense of practicality in 
their strategies to overcome the ill effects of governmental regulation and interference. 
Their resourcefulness is evident when some of these businesswomen reveal their 
subversive tricks to ‘buy’ worker permits, or evade import duty by bringing raw materials 
as personal luggage, or to relocate their factories in neighbouring countries. They 
navigate around governmental policies, rules, and regulations without ever bringing their 
problems to the government because they are aware of the limitations of such an 
approach. Given the political history of Brunei, it would be self-defeating and ineffective 
to try to make the government change its policies. Hence avoiding the government 
altogether appears to be the most radical stratagem employed by the WBC members.   
It is also clear that the WBC members consider the WBC valuable as a space for 
the informal dissemination of business ideas and strategies in order to improve on their 
businesses. In every case, other WBC members have offered helpful suggestions, 
although, many of these suggestions involved a degree of traversing government rules 
and even law. Therefore, even though the WBC cannot in its official capacity help to 
influence economic and public policies about SMEs, it plays a powerful role in 
facilitating the formation of a collective identity amongst women who own “small and 
medium enterprises” in Brunei.  
The success stories of these women highlight the infinite possibilities that they 
have created for themselves despite testing economic circumstances in Brunei. There is 
little doubt that these WBC members are self-reliant and resourceful in addressing their 
own economic problems. Clearly, these women are highly able to independently and 
collectively help themselves to pursue their economic goals without resorting to asking 
held from the government or to lobby for changes in government policies. Their capacity 
to be autonomous and self-reliant in sustaining their economic position is indeed 
admirable. Given Brunei’s political system as a welfare-based monarchy, many Malay 
Muslim citizens are used to unconditional help from their government for their 
livelihoods and social status as public sector employees. These businesswomen are an 
exception by creating an independent economic and social position for themselves as 
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entrepreneurs who have carved independence from government help, and to an extent, 
























To Tie Some Loose Ends … 
 
This thesis has been preoccupied with exploring the trials and tribulations of one 
section of Brunei society: the middle-aged Malay Muslim businesswomen of the 
Women’s Business Council. I had initially chosen these women precisely because of the 
unique nature of their organization and its members. 
To contextualize this study, I reiterated that the expansion and accessibility of 
education enabled the fluidity of social and economic relations women in Brunei 
experience today. In Chapter Three, we took a detour to historicize how the government’s 
own anxiety about an increasing professional migrant population compelled the 
government to educate and employ women in the seventies and eighties. The national 
preoccupation with expatriates led to the hastening of social change in Bruneian society 
which until then had largely patriarchal and traditional outlooks on women’s role in 
society. The mobility of the educated women within the society and economy of Brunei 
has been enabled to a large extent by the government’s keen interest in absorbing them 
into the public sector administration.  However, the public sector remains the preferred 
employer for any citizen of Brunei, regardless of their gender.  But by the 1990s, the 
government bureaucracy had grown so bloated that it was impending a dramatic yet 
controversial reduction in size. 
This thesis elaborated upon how the educated middle-aged women were 
encouraged to seek alternative sources of employment that were only partially dependent 
on the government. As in these businesswomen were still civil servants and their 
organization the WBC were formed by state patronage, yet we came across marginal 
spaces when these women worked within the informal network of the WBC to 
circumnavigate some government imposed regulations.  
Unlike a modern organizational structure with the entitlement to negotiate or 
lobby the state for member’s interests and rights, the WBC operated more as an informal 
network or a sorority for these businesswomen. The informality of the network gave rise 
to unique strategies that could be understood as ‘illegal’ or ‘subversive in nature but upon 
which women had to depend. This was usually the case as the women were unable to 
depend on the state to help them out.  
 86
This study is a case study thus questions whether Brunei’s welfare is capable of 
providing for all the needs of its citizens. The case study also illustrates a tension which 
is emerging along gender lines and a state that is not responsive to the needs of small 
businesses, particularly those run by women.  This may also illustrate the relatively 
undeveloped nature of Bruneian women’s movement to posture themselves a politically 
strategic and critical lobby within the state.  
The government was instrumental in the formation of this unique class of Malay 
Muslim businesswomen and in the creation of the WBC. As I revealed in Chapter Two, 
the WBC symbolizes and represents the emerging economic and social identity of an 
unprecedented class of women in Brunei’s history: women entrepreneurs. In Chapter 
Four, we discovered that women in senior government positions were encouraged to take 
early retirement and start their own businesses when the government felt the urgency to 
diversify its economy due to pressing concerns about depleting oil reserves and the civil 
service’s increasing incapacity to provide employment for Brunei’s Malay Muslims 
citizens. The Bruneian government’s push to persuade women to venture into businesses 
was in line with global trends whereby female entrepreneurship have become more 
widespread across other Southeast Asian countries like Malaysia, Singapore and the 
Philippines.  
However, we saw in Chapter Five how this organization could not formally 
evolve as it was meant to be. Nevertheless, through my study of middle-aged Malay 
Muslim businesswomen of the WBC, I reveal that they were fairly resilient and did not 
depend on the state for survival and success in their enterprises. On an organizational 
level however, it began to operate more as an informal yet mutual benefiting support 
group of these women’s entrepreneurial endeavors. The organization was therefore useful 
despite its limited powers and political clout. We saw in the first three chapters that these 
women were initially dependent on the government for their economic positions as they 
were all civil service employees and even their decisions to open their businesses were in 
part due to government incentives.  
Instead, we learnt that these women successfully avoided dependence on 
government support and even circumvent restricting government policies as they fought 
to sustain their businesses. Their efforts show that these women were capable of 
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becoming employers themselves and maintaining an economically independent position. 
Their economic position emerged as a result of active negotiations between government 
policies and the personal desires of these women. In many ways, I observed that the 
informality of the structure gave rise to some unique strategies that were subversive or 
illegal in nature that were effective yet would have been impossible to implement had the 
State been as involved in their activities.  In an optimistic lens, this study affirms that 
their desire and ability to effectively yet confidently defer government regulations is a 
remarkable and unprecedented situation for Brunei.  
Considering that most Malay Muslims in Brunei are completely dependent on the 
government for their economic situation, these women’s position is symbolic of a new 
representation of a small population in Brunei society.  This case study thus rethinks the 
reigning assumption that the State of Brunei can quench the demands of all sections of its 
socio-economic framework. Hence, this inability of the state has resulted in a tension 
along gender roles assigned by the State.  
As noted in this thesis, public sector employment and political stability cannot be 
separated. Brunei has an autonomous and stable government which relies heavily on its 
Malay Muslim population as its base of legitimacy which in turn makes the state an agent 
protecting the interest of this ethnic group. In other words, the government “buys” its 
citizen’s loyalty through a comprehensive social welfare plan. Given the immense wealth 
generated by Brunei’s hydrocarbon reserves, this social welfare system is easily 
affordable and an effective way to distribute a small portion of national wealth in 
exchange for loyalty to and stability for the monarchic regime. Free education and health 
care, guaranteed pensions, as well as other benefits are still provided on a generous basis 
to its Malay Muslim citizens. In this light, even public employment is a means to 
“transfer the income generated by national wealth” in exchange for bureaucratic loyalty. 
For a long time, the only method of fostering employment has been by increasing the size 
of its public sector.144  
However there is a double bind to this political economy. If public sector jobs are 
the sole means through which the government buys the loyalty of its Malay Muslim 
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population, then the ability of the Sultan/government to maintain political stability would 
also be “limited” to the capacity of the bureaucracy to continue to finance public 
employment.145 Due to the exhaustible nature of its oil reserves, the continued 
sustainability of a growing bureaucracy soon became an issue. But as the government 
encouraged its female citizens to become small scale entrepreneurs as a means to ease its 
burden of providing public jobs for its people, such a move is double edged as an 
increasing independent population from government support could eventually also erode 
loyalty to the king/government. As a way of concluding this study, let me narrate an 
incident that took place in the graduate study room when I was revising my thesis. One of 
the new Masters Students at the Southeast Asian Studies Program where I am enrolled 
walked up to me and asked me if I was the girl studying Brunei. I explained that I was 
exploring the evolving economic position of Malay Muslim women in Brunei by 
elucidating their experiences towards becoming successful businesswomen. He looked at 
me for a moment, pursed his lips and shrugged,  
 
Everyone knows that all the businessmen are related to the royal family. I am 
sure these businesswomen are too. Since they probably are, then what 
economic change can you see? There is not much to study. It looks pretty 
obvious. Don’t you think?146  
 
My eyes widened as he spoke. It suddenly dawned on me that my study on 
businesswomen in Brunei has the potential to precisely unsettle such presumptions about 
Brunei businesswomen given such existing stereotypes on this tiny oil rich monarchy. In 
all honesty, one cannot accuse this student of being naïve about Brunei because I also 
shared such stereotypes before I embarked on my study of Brunei. I used to assume that 
most companies in Brunei would be somewhat related to the dominant Oil & Gas 
Industry in the country. I had not expected that I would encounter a first generation of 
businesswomen who were independently running enterprises in the construction, 
catering, and retailing sectors without the support of their fathers and/or husbands. 
Meeting women like Mariam, Hizah, Raina, Yanti and the other eleven members of the 
WBC interviewed for this research made me realize that Brunei  society was far from the 
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common stereotypes about an economic elite in the oil and gas industries who are closely 
tied to, and dependent on, the Sultan and the Brunei state,   
In fact none of my respondents owned businesses in the oil and gas industries or 
even in fields related to these industries. Furthermore, all these businesswomen were 
educated and had held senior government positions before becoming entrepreneurs. Also 
my findings show that the majority of the WBC members are first-generation 
entrepreneurs within their respective families. Although their families were supportive of 
their pursuits, their husbands and fathers played no direct role in the establishment of 
their businesses nor participated in the daily running of their businesses. More 
significantly, these businesswomen do not hail from “titled” or elite backgrounds. 
Interestingly enough, many of my respondents referred to themselves as “small 
Bruneians” or “commoners” in order to highlight their contrasting positions from titled 
elites or relations of the royalty. Indeed, their non-elitist identity lays at the heart of my 
concluding perspective on this study.  
While hailing from common, albeit upper-middle-class backgrounds, these 
businesswomen represent an emerging new class of entrepreneurs in Brunei. Their 
creation and emergence as a distinct social class not attached to royalty and high elites 
unsettled the preconceived notions about clear-cut binaries between the rich/nobility 
versus the poor/ commoner class in Brunei society.  
Such a scenario is precisely budding as we see in the case of the WBC women as 
they gained economic independence from the government and even sought to undermine 
government policies which obstructed the growth of their businesses.  When the times 
comes when the Brunei government can no longer buy loyalty from its citizen, this oil-
rich kingdom that has survived for so long due to the dependency of its population on the 
state’s welfare might face the possibility of political upheavals. At this point, such a 
scenario still seems far-fetched. But I do have conviction that a dynamic and uncertain 
future lies ahead of the country as independent social groups such as the WBC 
businesswomen are emerging which might challenge the idea about Brunei as 
“unthinkable as anything but a monarchy.”147  
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